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Remedial Convergence and Collapse 
Leah Litman* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article describes and interrogates a phenomenon of 
spillovers across remedies—how the legal standards governing the 
availability of remedies in cases regarding executive violations of 
individuals’ constitutional rights, particularly in the area of policing, 
have converged around similar ideas that narrow the availability of 
several different remedies. A similar set of limits restricts the 
availability of writs of habeas corpus to challenge criminal 
convictions, damages against government officials, the exclusion of 
evidence in criminal trials, and causes of action to sue federal 
officials for damages. The convergence results in considerable 
tension in the doctrine and notable effects in practice. For example, 
courts frequently deny one remedy on the ground that another 
remedy is available and preferable to the remedy that a party has 
sought. But when the same standard governs the availability of 
remedies that are supposed to substitute for one another, courts 
eliminate all remedies when they deny one of them. The remedial 
doctrines discussed in this Article primarily address executive 
violations of constitutional rights, particularly violations that occur 
in the course of policing. Denying the availability of remedies in 
cases that involve policing and executive power replicates the 
racialized effects of policing in the federal courts and forsakes 
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Much has been written about the relationship between rights and 
remedies. Some scholars have depicted rights and remedies as separable and 
distinct stages of adjudication.1 Other scholars, drawing from Marbury v. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 9, 10, 45 (1975) (distinguishing between the law of constitutional rules and implementing rules 
concerning remedies). 
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Madison,2 have focused on how the availability of legal remedies determines 
the efficacy of legal rights.3 Yet another group of scholars has suggested that 
remedial considerations shape the scope of rights,4 because concerns about a 
particular remedy will lead a court to narrow the underlying right, and the 
narrowed right will then be applied in cases that involve other remedies.5 
This Article focuses on a different kind of relationship, the relationship 
among the different remedies themselves. It outlines a phenomenon of 
spillovers across different remedies—how the rules that govern the scope of 
one remedy can influence the rules that govern the availability of other 
remedies.6 
This Article shows how the standards that govern the availability of 
different remedies for actions of executive officials, often in cases related to 
policing, have converged around similar principles and conditions.7 The 
existing scholarship that focuses on remedies rather than rights has observed 
that, over the last several decades, judicial decisions have narrowed the 
 
 2. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
 3. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1777–91 (1991) (explaining that remedies must be 
available to ensure government remains within the bounds of the law); Douglas Laycock, How 
Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 165 (2008) (“A right with no effective 
remedy is unenforceable and largely illusory.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2004 (1998) (noting that exploration of “the complications that arise in the 
definition of rights and in the operation of remedies when the Equal Protection Clause is used in 
criminal adjudication”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) (“Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to 
the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence. . . . Outside of constitutional law, it has 
long been understood that rights and remedies are, in many important contexts, functionally 
inseparable.”). 
 5. Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211 (2014); Jennifer E. 
Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1015–57 (2010); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, Enforcing Rights, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 306, 345 (2015) (suggesting multiple remedial avenues should be available for constitutional 
rights because of slippage between rights and remedies); Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 377, 382–96 (2014) (same); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 436–37, 440–
45, 447–48, 454 (2012) (same). 
 6. This framework does not endorse any kind of inherent separability of rights and remedies 
but focuses on the legal rules that are formally tied to remedies, as distinct from rights, and the sources 
of those legal rules. 
 7. “Spillover across remedies” is the phrase Michael Coenen uses to describe a different 
phenomenon—how concerns about a particular remedy lead courts to narrow the scope of the 
underlying right, which then leads courts to apply that narrowed right in cases seeking other remedies. 
See Coenen, supra note 5, at 1218. Jennifer Laurin used the phrase “convergence” to discuss Herring 
v. United States and the trajectory of qualified immunity and exclusionary rule doctrine in a piece I 
will discuss. See infra notes 111–113, 117–124 and accompanying text. See Jennifer E. Laurin, 
Trawling For Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 
(2011) [hereinafter Laurin, Trawling]. 
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availability of remedies.8 This Article, however, focuses primarily on the 
mechanism by which the availability of remedies has been narrowed, i.e., the 
specific legal rules that have narrowed the availability of remedies in public 
law cases and the reasoning that animates those legal rules.9 
Scholars have already identified some of the normative problems that 
arise when the Court raises the standards for obtaining many different kinds of 
remedies in cases challenging the lawfulness of executive action.10 In 
particular, these scholars have identified how raising the various remedial 
standards has resulted in a kind of remedial collapse, where all of the remedies 
are collectively unavailable for the violation or violations of a constitutional 
right. The collapse of the overall system of remedies results in two divergent 
systems of precedent, one purporting to outline substantive rights and the other 
dictating when those rights will be enforced.11 The disconnect between the two 
lines means that there is no robust system to enforce or potentially deter 
violations of constitutional rights as such; rather, constitutional rights are 
refracted through a demanding standard that dictates—and often limits—the 
availability of different remedies.12 The disconnect between rights and judicial 
remedies is particularly evident in cases involving executive officials’ 
treatment of citizens, particularly in cases involving policing, which may raise 
additional concerns.13 
As this Article shows, the mechanism by which the Court has ratcheted up 
the standards for obtaining different remedies is convergence. The Court has 
 
 8. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017). 
 9. In a pair of articles, Aziz Huq has argued that the standard for obtaining writs of habeas 
corpus to challenge criminal convictions, and the standards for qualified immunity and the 
exclusionary rule, have converged on a “fault-based” standard. See Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial 
Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 29, 29, 34–40 (2015) 
[hereinafter Huq, Judicial Independence]; Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519, 581–93 (2014) [hereinafter Huq, Habeas]; see also Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The 
Triumph of Fault in Public Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. at 47–51 (forthcoming 2018). This Article 
observes the remedial convergence across a broader domain that includes the availability of implied 
causes of action against federal and state officials for equitable relief, a topic Huq specifically brackets 
as not fitting within his framework. See Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 66–67. It also 
demonstrates a deeper convergence than Huq covers, including standards for causation, systemic 
wrongdoing, and the levels of generality at which prior cases should be read. Huq also disclaims that 
his project is to “criticize” the convergence, which this Article does. See id. at 4 n.9. 
  Jennifer Laurin’s piece argues that the standards for qualified immunity and the 
exclusionary rule borrow from one another and have converged. See Laurin, Trawling, supra note 7. 
This Article broadens the lens to include habeas corpus to challenge convictions and the availability of 
causes of action; it also explores the consequences of remedial convergence across this broader set of 
remedies. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2532–40 (1996) (identifying concerns with this 
two-track system of adjudication). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
2018] REMEDIAL CONVERGENCE AND COLLAPSE 1481 
systematically leveled up the standards for obtaining different remedies so that 
the remedial standards closely resemble one another. The legal standards that 
govern the availability of different remedies in cases of executive misconduct 
(damages against officials, exclusion of evidence, habeas corpus, and damages 
against entities) have converged on a similar set of principles and preconditions 
for obtaining the remedies. For these remedies, the party seeking relief must 
generally identify a prior Supreme Court case that both speaks with clarity to 
the precise question in the party’s case and demonstrates that the party’s rights 
have been violated. Thus, the Court has stated that a party seeking to obtain 
damages from state or federal officials must show that “existing precedent 
[has] placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.”14 Likewise, a 
prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must demonstrate that “holdings, as 
opposed to the dicta, of th[e] [Supreme] Court’s decisions” have “confront[ed] 
‘the specific question presented’” in the prisoner’s case.15 The Court has also 
directed that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded from a criminal 
trial “only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or 
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 
unconstitutional.”16 And the Court recently held that courts should not 
recognize a cause of action for damages against federal officials if a plaintiff’s 
case is “different in a meaningful way” from “previous . . . cases decided by 
th[e] [Supreme] Court.”17 
The standards governing the availability of different remedies have also 
converged in other ways as well, such as the level of generality at which to read 
prior Supreme Court cases and the kinds of wrongdoing that merit a remedy. In 
both damages suits and habeas corpus cases, the Court has stressed that a party 
is not entitled to relief if “none of the [existing] cases squarely governs” the 
party’s case.18 And in both damages suits and exclusionary rule cases, a party is 
not entitled to relief for government wrongdoing that results from ordinary 
negligence,19 but may be entitled to relief in cases of “systemic or recurrent 
police misconduct.”20 
 
 14. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also City and County of San Francisco 
v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (questioning whether “controlling circuit precedent could 
constitute clearly established federal law” for purposes of qualified immunity). 
 15. Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376–77 (2015). 
 16. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009). 
 17. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859 (2017). 
 18. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 
201 (2004)) (discussing damages); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (stating that 
petitioner is not entitled to writ of habeas corpus if “[n]o decision of th[e] Court . . . squarely addresses 
the issue in th[e] case”). 
 19. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (deeming a government entity liable 
for damages only for “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons,” not for all employee 
wrongdoing or negligence on the part of the entity). 
 20. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
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This Article constructs an account of these and other spillovers among 
different remedies and critically examines the consequences and implications 
of remedial convergence. Remedial convergence brings into focus a pattern of 
disingenuous substitution, where courts deny one remedy on the ground that 
another remedy can and should substitute for whatever remedy a plaintiff has 
sought and the court has denied. For example, in criminal cases, the Court will 
hold that an application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted and point to the 
possibility of civil damages as an alternative remedy,21 while in civil cases 
where damages are sought, the Court will hold that an officer is immune from 
damages and point to the exclusionary rule as an alternative remedy.22 But 
when the same standard dictates the availability of different remedies that are 
supposed to substitute for one another, courts will be foreclosing all of the 
remedies when they rely on that standard to deny one of the remedies. 
While this Article primarily focuses on the relationship between the 
different remedies, it is impossible to completely cleave those remedies away 
from the rights themselves. After all, one problem with systematically 
ratcheting up the different remedial standards is the effect on the underlying 
rights. And the remedial standard that the Court has applied to writs of habeas 
corpus, exclusion of evidence, the availability of damages, and the availability 
of a cause of action is tied to the nature of the underlying right, how clearly 
existing case law specifies that right, and how normatively egregious the 
violation was. Some scholars have thus described or characterized some of the 
legal standards as choice-of-law standards that govern litigation on the merits.23 
This Article, however, emphasizes how the standards ultimately govern the 
availability of particular remedies (writs of habeas corpus to state court 
prisoners, or damages), even though the content and structure of the standards 
is tied to, and thus often a part of, an adjudication of the merits.24 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the depth and breadth 
of spillover among qualified immunity from damages, writs of habeas corpus to 
challenge criminal convictions, exclusion of evidence from criminal trials, and 
the availability of causes of action against federal officials. Part II critically 
examines the consequences of that remedial convergence and assesses the legal 
reasoning behind it. After demonstrating how convergence makes little sense of 
the doctrine and the remedies themselves, Part III discusses some alternative 
 
 21. Id. at 2064 (identifying prospect of “civil liability” as reason not to apply the exclusionary 
rule). 
 22. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009) (identifying the exclusionary rule as a 
mechanism to address issues that are not decided in civil cases because of qualified immunity). 
 23. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 65, 
95 (2017) (identifying qualified immunity as a remedial standard, but the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule as a merits question); Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 
VA. L. REV. 417, 493–95 (2018) (identifying AEDPA’s relitigation bar as pertaining to the merits). 
 24. Cf. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (noting slippage between 
considering the availability of a remedy and whether there was a violation of a right). 
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explanations for the remedial convergence (how various standards in 
apparently disparate areas of doctrine are turning more and more similar) and 
collapse (how parties seeking relief end up with no viable remedies at all). 
I. 
REMEDIAL CONVERGENCE 
In the last several decades, the Supreme Court has established demanding 
thresholds that plaintiffs must satisfy to obtain damages from government 
officials under the doctrine of qualified immunity, stringent thresholds for 
prisoners to overturn convictions via a writ of habeas corpus under the doctrine 
of retroactivity and the judicial gloss on a statutory relitigation bar applicable to 
state prisoners, exacting standards for defendants to exclude unlawfully 
obtained evidence from their criminal trials, and narrow standards for when 
plaintiffs have a cause of action against federal officials for damages. All of 
these different remedial standards have also converged around similar ideas 
and limitations. 
This Section shows how the different remedial standards have converged 
on one another in the premium they place on the existence of relevant Supreme 
Court precedent, the degree to which a plaintiff’s case should resemble that 
Supreme Court precedent, the level of generality at which to read the 
purportedly relevant Supreme Court precedent, how obviously unlawful 
official conduct must be in light of that precedent, and the heightened standards 
for causation and liability of superior officers even in the face of systemic 
wrongdoing. Part I.A highlights the overlap between the qualified immunity 
defense and two limitations on post-conviction review: retroactivity doctrine 
and the Court’s interpretation of the relitigation bar. Part I.B shows the overlap 
between those two remedial standards and the contours of the exclusionary 
rule. Finally, Part I.C demonstrates the overlap between qualified immunity, 
the retroactivity and relitigation bars, the exclusionary rule, and the standard 
for the availability of a cause of action against federal officials for damages.25 
 
 25. This Article does not focus on the separate issues and literature unique to structural 
injunctions, and the Court’s recent actions in that domain. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443 (2009) 
(pressing for easier modification of reform injunctions); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (finding 
violations not widespread enough to justify injunction); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) 
(same); Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993). While injunctions 
may, in some cases, be a more effective remedy than individual remediation, the heightened standing 
requirements for obtaining injunctions belie the suggestion that the Court is substituting more effective 
remedies for less effective ones. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). As numerous 
commentators have explained, the Court has limited aggregation litigation that results in forward-
looking injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g., Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 
843, 875–901 (2016) (describing limits of injunctive or declaratory class actions that do not raise 
prototypical concerns with class actions); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: 
Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399 
(2000) (describing how Lyons forces parties to seek damages, not injunctive relief); Rachel A. 
Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11, 11 n.29 
(2009) (citing cases “declar[ing] that most potential plaintiffs lack standing to sue police departments 
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A. Convergence of Qualified Immunity and Federal Habeas Corpus 
This Section identifies how the common-law-like barriers to obtaining 
damages awards against federal and state officials, and to overturning 
convictions via writs of habeas corpus, have increasingly converged on one 
another. 
1. Damages Suits: Qualified Immunity 
The Supreme Court has held that both federal and state officials enjoy a 
qualified immunity from suits for damages.26 The current qualified immunity 
standard originated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which held that “government 
officials performing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”27 
Since Harlow, the Court has further clarified the scope of officials’ 
qualified immunity. In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court explained that, for a 
right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates 
that right.”28 The Court also cautioned against defining the relevant law at a 
high “level of generality,”29 and has “repeatedly” emphasized that point in 
subsequent cases.30 The “dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature 
of particular conduct is clearly established.’”31 The “clearly established” 
requirement, the Court has explained, “protects officials accused of violating 
‘extremely abstract rights.’”32 
 
for equitable relief”); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1418 (2007) (arguing that Lyons and other related cases “preclude the use of 
systemic remedies for what are, at bottom, institutional and systemic problems”). 
 26. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982) (adopting modern qualified immunity 
standard); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397–
98 (1971) (finding cause of action existing and remanding for a determination on immunity from 
damages); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (holding that section 1983 incorporates 
common law immunities). 
 27. 457 U.S. at 818. While section 1983 contains a cause of action for statutory and 
constitutional claims, this Section focuses on constitutional claims, although the qualified immunity 
standard applies to both. 
 28. 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 29. Id. at 639. 
 30. See, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (cautioning against defining rights “at 
a high level of generality” (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011))); City and Cty. of 
S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2015) (“That is far too general a proposition to control this 
case.”). 
 31. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742); see also 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (explaining that the inquiry “must be 
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”); Pauly, 137 
S. Ct. at 552 (“[T]he clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”) (quoting 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 32. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639). 
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The difference between generality and particularity isn’t obvious from the 
terms themselves. The Court has used generality to refer to the articulation of 
generally applicable legal rules. Thus, for example, a “general principle that 
deadly force requires a sufficient threat” does not qualify as a clearly 
established right when the principle is applied to different sets of facts.33 
Meanwhile, particularity appears to mean something like pertinent or material 
facts about a case. To illustrate how that inquiry turns on the specifics of a 
particular case, the Court framed the “relevant inquiry” in one qualified 
immunity case as whether it was clear that an officer could not “confront[] a 
reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding capture through high-speed 
vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had threatened to shoot police 
officers, and who was moments away from encountering an officer” near a 
road block by shooting him.34 
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the Court has placed 
a high premium on the existence of case law. That is, it has, at times, suggested 
that an officer’s conduct must be clearly unlawful in light of precedent that 
speaks to a plaintiff’s claim, as opposed to the officer’s conduct merely being 
normatively unambiguous, such that there wouldn’t be reasonable 
disagreement about whether the officer’s conduct is unlawful.35 “[E]xisting 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.”36 A right may not be clearly established if “none of the cases squarely 
governs” a plaintiff’s case.37 The Court has, however, left open the possibility 
that some outrageous conduct would be so transparently unlawful that specific 
case law wouldn’t be needed in order to clearly establish that the officer’s 
conduct was unlawful.38 But divisions among the courts of appeals and state 
 
 33. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 309. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., id. (“The relevant inquiry is whether existing precedent placed the conclusion 
that [the officer] acted unreasonably in these circumstances ‘beyond debate.’” (quoting al-Kidd, 563 
U.S. at 741)). 
 36. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
 37. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308–09 (2015) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199–
200, 201 (2004)). Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly held that a right is not clearly established 
because prior cases involved different facts. See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 310 (“The dissent can cite 
no case from this Court denying qualified immunity because officers entitled to terminate a high-speed 
chase selected one dangerous alternative over another.”); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2013) 
(distinguishing prior cases because they did not “involve[] hot pursuit”); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 
565 U.S. 535, 555–56 (2012). 
 38. See, e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“We do not require a case directly on point, but 
existing precedent must have placed the . . . question beyond debate.”). Hope v. Pelzer is arguably an 
example of this category. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The conduct that courts have said is not sufficiently 
egregious so as to be beyond reasonable debate suggests this category is quite small. See, e.g., Kisela 
v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018); id. at 1155–56 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court maintains that specific case law is not required, but nonetheless holds that unreasonable actions 
are entitled to qualified immunity); see also Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017); Doe v. 
Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017); Lincoln v. Turner, 874 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2017); supra note 
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courts about the right’s contours and scope are evidence that the right is not 
clearly established.39 
Harlow did not state whether “clearly established law” includes only the 
law of the Supreme Court, as opposed to other federal courts such as the courts 
of appeals.40 In subsequent cases, however, the Court has declared that only a 
“robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” clearly establishes a right 
for purposes of qualified immunity.41 It has also suggested that a plaintiff must 
show that the law is clearly established “in the entire United States,” though 
perhaps only for certain officials.42 The Court has also recently made clear that 
it has only ever assumed that “controlling circuit precedent could constitute 
clearly established federal law,” even in cases where the relevant officials do 
not have nationwide authority.43 
Finally, the Court has defined the scope of qualified immunity and whom 
it protects as “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate 
the law.”44 “[S]o long as ‘a reasonable officer could have believed that his 
conduct was justified,’” the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.45 
2. Habeas Corpus 
The Supreme Court has also fashioned two interconnected limitations on 
when prisoners can use writs of habeas corpus to challenge their convictions: 
the bar against retroactive application of new constitutional rules, and the 
interpretation of the relitigation bar for prisoners who were convicted in state 
court. Under current doctrine, the bar against retroactive application of new 
 
37 and text accompanying notes 32–34. But see Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(denying qualified immunity). 
 39. See, e.g., City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015) (citing differing 
conclusions of the courts of appeals); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044–45 (2015) (same); Lane 
v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014) (same); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 351 (2014) (same); 
Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5 (noting that “federal and state courts nationwide are sharply divided on the 
question whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a 
home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect”). 
 40. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 818 n.32 (1982). 
 41. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42. In that case, the Court stated that district court decisions—or 
at least one district court decision—did not qualify because “a district judge’s ipse dixit of a holding is 
not ‘controlling authority’ in any jurisdiction.” Id. 
 42. Id. at 741–42; see also id. at 745–46 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The fact that the Attorney 
General holds a high office in the Government must inform what law is clearly established for the 
purposes of this case.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776; Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350 (per curiam); Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012) (“This Court has never held that there is such a right.”). But see 
Franks, 134 S. Ct at 2382 (“If Martinez and Tindal were controlling in the Eleventh Circuit in 2009, 
we would agree with Lane that Franks could not reasonably have believed that it was lawful to fire 
Lane in retaliation for his testimony.”). 
 44. Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 45. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777. 
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constitutional rules applies to both federal and state prisoners,46 whereas the 
relitigation bar applies only to state court prisoners. Although a statute codified 
the relitigation bar, the Court has largely fashioned the scope of the relitigation 
bar on its own, given the sparse statutory text,47 and the relitigation bar mirrors 
in many respects the bar against retroactive application of new constitutional 
rules.48 
a. Retroactivity Bar.  
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court held that “new” constitutional rules 
do not apply to cases that have become final.49 A case becomes final when the 
Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari over a defendant’s appeal, or the 
time to file a petition for certiorari has expired.50 Thus, Teague’s retroactivity 
bar limits what kinds of rules can be used by defendants in federal habeas 
proceedings that occur after a defendant’s conviction has become final.51 
Teague defined a “new” rule as a rule that “breaks new ground or imposes 
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.”52 Framed in 
slightly different terms, a rule is “new . . . if the result was not dictated by 
precedent.”53 After Teague, the Court solidified an expansive interpretation of 
 
 46. Danforth v. Minnesota observed that the reasoning for the retroactivity bar “seems equally 
applicable” to cases involving federal prisoners. See 552 U.S. 264, 281 n.16 (2008). Teague v. Lane 
also specifically adopted Justice Harlan’s views on retroactivity, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), and Justice 
Harlan did not distinguish between state and federal prisoners. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 
681 n.1 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). In subsequent cases, the Court has noted the question without 
deciding it. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016); Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
1103, 1113 n.16 (2013). 
 47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the 
Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and 
Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. 
L. REV. 1219, 1224–37 (2015) (documenting development of habeas standard). 
 48. The exceptions being that only Supreme Court cases are relevant in the relitigation bar and 
that there are two exceptions to the retroactivity bar that do not apply to the relitigation bar. See Greene 
v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 44 n.* (2011) (“Whether § 2254(d)(1) would bar a federal habeas petitioner 
from relying on a decision that came after the last state-court adjudication on the merits, but fell within 
one of the exceptions recognized in Teague . . . is a question we need not address to resolve this 
case.”). 
 49. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 50. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011). 
 51. The exceptions are for “substantive rules,” Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264–
65 (2016), and watershed rules of criminal procedure that are fundamental to ordered liberty and affect 
the likelihood of convicting an innocent person. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–13; see also Whorton v. 
Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–18 (2007) (describing the exception as a narrow one). 
 52. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
 53. Id. As several commentators have observed, that definition is itself expansive, because few 
Supreme Court cases are truly dictated by prior ones; rather, there are merely better and worse 
interpretations of prior cases. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1758–64 (1991) (using insights 
of legal positivism to argue that judges make law in a vast array of cases subject to constraints of 
reasoning); Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 820–27 (1992) (explaining 
how many criminal procedure rights are fashioned in that way). 
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what rules are considered “new.”54 The bar against applying “new” rules, the 
Court explained, means that “reasonable,” though ultimately erroneous, 
decisions would not be overturned.55 And “[r]easonableness . . . is an objective 
standard.”56 A rule is new if it is “susceptible to debate among reasonable 
minds”;57 a rule is old, and dictated by precedent, if the rule would have been 
“apparent to all reasonable jurists.”58 
The Court also discussed what kind of evidence would establish that a 
rule is new: decisions of the federal courts of appeal that reach different 
conclusions (i.e., decisions that did not anticipate a given rule) establish that a 
rule is new,59 as do similar decisions of state courts.60 And if the decision 
announcing the “new rule” had dissents61 or fractured opinions62 or few 
citations,63 that too is evidence that a rule is new. This framework often 
requires a Supreme Court decision that is quite similar to a prisoner’s case. If a 
prior Supreme Court decision did not explicitly resolve the question presented 
in the case the prisoner relies on, the later case is likely to have fractured 
opinions or a dissent in the Supreme Court. And without a very on-point prior 
Supreme Court decision, all of the federal courts and state courts probably 
wouldn’t have anticipated the subsequent Supreme Court decision. Indeed, 
without disagreement among the federal and state courts, it’s not clear that the 
Supreme Court would have taken the case. 
The Court has also emphasized that prior decisions should not be defined 
at a high “level of generality” to bring new, subsequent rules within the scope 
of old ones.64 For example, in Butler v. McKellar, the Court held that a prior 
decision had announced a “new” rule when it forbade police from re-initiating 
interrogation about an unrelated crime after a suspect has requested counsel.65 
Although prior cases had held that the police may not initiate further 
interrogation once a suspect asks for counsel, McKellar explained that applying 
 
 54. In Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), the Court generated several fractured opinions on 
when the application of an established principle to new facts generated a new rule. Compare 505 U.S. 
at 293–95 (Thomas, J., plurality) (suggesting review of application of law to fact should be 
deferential), with id. at 311–12 (Souter, J., concurring) (same), with id. at 303–04 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (suggesting review of application of law to fact is de novo), with id. at 308–09 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (suggesting application of established law to fact would not generate new rules). 
 55. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990); id. at 415 (noting that “reasonable contrary 
conclusions” are evidence that a rule is new). 
 56. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992). 
 57. McKellar, 494 U.S. at 415; see also Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 
(2013). 
 58. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997). 
 59. McKellar, 494 U.S. at 415 (citing the “differing positions taken by the judges of the Courts 
of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits”). 
 60. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395 (1994). 
 61. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 415 (2004). 
 62. O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 159 (1997). 
 63. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 529 (1997). 
 64. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990). 
 65. 494 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1990). 
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that holding to prohibit re-initiating interrogation about another crime resulted 
in a new rule. The Court later explained that a rule is new if prior cases did “not 
speak directly . . . to the issue presented” in the defendant’s case.66 
b. Relitigation Bar.  
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act subsequently created 
several restrictions on post-conviction review, including a relitigation bar that 
resembles Teague’s retroactivity bar. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not 
grant a state court prisoner a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless “the adjudication of the 
claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”67 
Terry Williams v. Taylor interpreted section 2254(d)(1)’s reference to 
“clearly established Federal law” to codify in substantial part the judicially 
created rules of retroactivity, i.e., the Teague doctrine.68 Terry Williams, 
however, recognized that the relitigation bar modified Teague in one respect: 
The “old rule”—i.e., the “clearly established Federal law”—had to come from 
the Supreme Court, as opposed to the lower federal courts or state courts.69 
Terry Williams also defined when a state court decision would be an 
“unreasonable application” of or “contrary to” a prior Supreme Court case. A 
state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law, 
Terry Williams explained, if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 
that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a 
case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable 
facts.”70 And a state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly 
established Supreme Court law if the decision is “objectively unreasonable” in 
 
 66. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990); see also Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 
531–32 (1997) (distinguishing prior cases from the rule petitioner sought); Graham v. Collins, 506 
U.S. 461, 475–76 (1993) (same); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993) (distinguishing prior 
case as insufficiently similar because it was a capital case); id. at 344 (rejecting “expansive reading” of 
prior cases as a way to formulate what was compelled by prior decisions). 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 68. 529 U.S. 362, 379–80 (2000); id. at 382 (“A rule that fails to satisfy the foregoing criteria 
is barred by Teague from application on collateral review, and, similarly, is not available as a basis for 
relief in a habeas case to which AEDPA applies.”); id. at 412 (“With one caveat, whatever would 
qualify as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ under § 2254(d)(1).”). 
 69. 529 U.S. at 412 (“The one caveat . . . is that § 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 
established law to this Court’s jurisprudence.”). Since Terry Williams, the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that the only relevant law is law that has been established by the Supreme Court, as 
opposed to some other federal court. See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012) (“The Sixth 
Circuit also erred by consulting its own precedents, rather than those of this Court, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision.”). 
 70. 529 U.S. at 412–13. 
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that it “identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies 
it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.”71 
The Court has since elaborated on when a state court decision is an 
“objectively unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court 
law, both with respect to how to define the scope of Supreme Court law that is 
clearly established and how wrong or unreasonable the state court decision 
must be. “[C]learly established Federal law” in section 2254(d)(1), Terry 
Williams explained, “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] 
[Supreme] Court’s decisions.”72 In several subsequent decisions, the Court has 
explained that the “holdings” of prior cases should be construed narrowly; only 
cases that “confront ‘the specific question presented by’” a case fall within a 
“holding” of a prior decision.73 It is not enough “if the circumstances of a case 
are only ‘similar to’” a prior case.74 Federal courts may not “fram[e] [Supreme 
Court] precedents at . . . a high level of generality.”75 For example, in Carey v. 
Musladin, the Court addressed whether a state court prisoner could receive a 
writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he was denied a fair trial when 
members of the victim’s family appeared at trial with buttons commemorating 
the victim.76 The Supreme Court explained that prior cases concerning the 
guarantee of a fair trial did not clearly establish that spectator conduct could 
deprive a defendant of a fair trial because the prior cases involved “state-
sponsored courtroom practices” like uniformed state troopers or a defendant 
made to wear prison clothing, rather than spectator conduct.77 
Since Musladin, the Court has concluded on several occasions that prior 
decisions do not “clearly establish” a proposition when “[n]o decision of th[e] 
Court . . . squarely addresses the issue in th[e] case.”78 Along similar lines, the 
 
 71. Id. at 409, 407. 
 72. Id. at 412. 
 73. Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 
(2014) (per curiam)). 
 74. Id.; see also id. (“[N]one of those cases dealt with circumstances like those present here.”). 
 75. Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 (2013); see also Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 
1372, 1377 (2015) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit framed the issue at too high a level of generality.”); Lopez v. 
Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (“This proposition is far too abstract to establish clearly the specific rule 
respondent needs.”); Nevada, 133 S. Ct. at 1994 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (explaining that a 
lower federal court could transform even the most imaginative extension of existing case law into 
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court”). 
 76. 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
 77. Id. at 76. 
 78. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008); see also White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 
1697, 1703–04 (2014) (quoting United States v. Whitten, 623 F.3d 125, 131–32 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Livingston, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We have ‘never directly held that 
Carter applies at a sentencing phase where the Fifth Amendment interests of the defendant are 
different.’”); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1791–92 (2013) (concluding the case fell outside 
the scope of the holdings of two prior Supreme Court decisions); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 
111, 122 (2009) (quoting Wright, 552 at 123) (“[T]his Court has held on numerous occasions that it is 
not ‘an unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to 
apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court.”). 
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Court has explained that cases applying a general standard clearly establish 
only the existence of that standard and the application of the standard to the 
particular facts of that case.79 “The more general the rule, the more leeway 
courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”80 
Subsequent cases have also offered more detail about what kinds of 
adjudications are “objectively unreasonable.” “A state court’s determination,” 
the Court has explained, is not “objectively unreasonable” “so long as 
‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 
decision.”81 That means “a state prisoner must” identify an error so “well 
understood and comprehended in existing law” that it is “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”82 The Court has also identified what 
kinds of evidence might establish that a state court decision was not 
unreasonable. For example, Carey v. Musladin reasoned that prior cases could 
not have clearly established that private spectator conduct could deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial because several lower courts had concluded it did not.83 
The standards for obtaining writs of habeas corpus and overcoming 
officials’ qualified immunity from damages have thus converged in several 
respects. Both standards require the party seeking relief to identify a case on 
point—an example where a court, and preferably the Supreme Court, has 
declared that the facts alleged by the party seeking relief amount to a 
constitutional violation.84 Both standards caution against reading cases 
expansively or applying their reasoning beyond their facts. Thus, in the 
qualified immunity context, the Court has said that “existing precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”85 And with 
respect to the litigation bar in post-conviction proceedings, the Court has said 
that federal habeas relief is permissible only “where there is no possibility 
 
 79. See, e.g., Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122–23 (2009). 
 80. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 654 (2004); see also Woods v. Donald, 
135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014)). Thus, 
Supreme Court decisions applying a general standard, such as the standard for what constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel, establish little beyond the facts of those cases. See, e.g., Mirzayance, 
556 U.S. at 123. 
 81. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). 
 82. Metrish, 133 S. Ct. at 1786–87 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101); see also Burt v. Titlow, 
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (same); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 524 (2012) (same). 
 83. See 549 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2006) (citing decisions); see also White, 134 S. Ct. at 1703 (“The 
Courts of Appeals have recognized that Mitchell left this unresolved; their diverging approaches to the 
question illustrate the possibility of fairminded disagreement.”). 
 84. See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2381 (2014) (“Eleventh Circuit precedent did not 
preclude Franks from reasonably holding that belief. And no decision of this Court was sufficiently 
clear to cast doubt on the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.”); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 
2068 (2014) (“No decision of which we are aware, however, would alert Secret Service agents 
engaged in crowd control that they bear a First Amendment obligation ‘to ensure that groups with 
different viewpoints are at comparable locations at all times.’”); Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 
 85. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
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fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with 
th[e] [Supreme] Court’s precedents.”86 
B. Exclusionary Rule 
The standard for excluding evidence in a criminal trial has also converged 
around principles that appear in the standard for obtaining damages and the 
standard for obtaining writs of habeas corpus. In United States v. Leon, the 
Supreme Court recognized a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule 
and held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement should not be excluded from a criminal trial where the 
evidence was “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently 
invalidated search warrant.”87 In the course of justifying the exclusionary rule, 
the Court invoked Justice Harlan’s proposed bar on the retroactive application 
of new constitutional rules, which the Court ultimately adopted in Teague.88 
And to explain what constitutes officers’ objectively reasonable conduct, Leon 
cited Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the case establishing modern qualified immunity 
doctrine: “[T]he officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination and on . . . the warrant . . . must be objectively reasonable.”89 
This Section highlights how the exclusionary rule, as well as the scope of 
habeas corpus and qualified immunity, have been driven by similar animating 
principles, and have also converged on similar specific limitations. Part I.B.1 
identifies how the generally applicable standard for the exclusion of evidence 
(and particularly the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule) resembles 
the Court’s general definitions of the scope of qualified immunity and the 
contours of the relitigation and retroactivity bars. Part I.B.2 further shows how 
other features of the exclusionary rule—specifically the focus on systemic 
wrongdoing and heightened causation—have come to resemble the qualified 
immunity defense and some aspects of post-conviction review. 
 
 86. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (internal citations omitted). 
 87. 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 912–13 (1984): 
Similarly, although the Court has been unwilling to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles 
are always to have only prospective effect, United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982), no 
Fourth Amendment decision marking a “clear break with the past” has been applied retroactively. See 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Linkletter 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). The propriety of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth 
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely in terms of the contribution retroactivity 
might make to the deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 560–561; 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 536–39, 542. 
 89. 468 U.S. at 922 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–19). In a footnote, the Court 
acknowledged that the “situations are not perfectly analogous.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
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1. General Convergence in Federal Habeas, Qualified Immunity, and 
Exclusion 
Formally, the standards for the exclusionary rule and qualified immunity 
differ in at least one key respect. Whereas the Court has rejected any focus on 
officers’ states of mind in qualified immunity,90 it has held out the possibility 
that the exclusionary rule would apply to intentional or wanton violations of the 
Fourth Amendment.91 Yet the Court has continued to cite qualified immunity 
cases to explicate the standard for exclusion from criminal trials,92 and 
exclusionary rule cases to explicate the standard for immunity in suits for 
damages.93 The Court has held “that ‘the same standard of objective 
reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon 
defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer.’”94 It has also explained the 
standard for issuing writs of habeas corpus in terms of the exclusionary rule, 
declaring in one of the very first cases to apply Teague that the retroactivity bar 
“validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents.”95 
The standards for qualified immunity, habeas corpus, and exclusion of 
evidence have also converged around a similar, overarching principle that 
purports to select for unreasonably egregious actions.96 Because qualified 
immunity from damages protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law,”97 it prevents damages in cases where “‘a 
reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct” was lawful.98 
Retroactivity doctrine identifies errors that would have been “apparent to all 
reasonable jurists.”99 Finally, the Court’s gloss on the relitigation bar prohibits 
writs of habeas corpus “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the 
correctness of the state court’s decision,”100 and corrects only errors that are so 
 
 90. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1982). 
 91. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143–45 (2009). The Court did, however, suggest 
that “conduct” could be “so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.” Id. at 146. 
 92. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 565 n.8 (2004); id. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 
578–79 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (citing Harlow). 
 93. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 897); id. at 350–54 
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting a different parallel between 
doctrines). 
 94. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 n.1 (2012) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 
344 (1986)). 
 95. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 918–19). 
 96. See, e.g., Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9; Huq, Habeas, supra note 9. But given 
how they have developed, the standards are selecting for actions that are unreasonably egregious in 
light of existing precedent, particularly Supreme Court precedent. 
 97. Malley, 457 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 98. City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015). 
 99. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527–28 (1997). 
 100. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
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“well understood and comprehended in existing law” that they are “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”101 
The Court has grafted similar concepts onto the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule, even though the standards for the remedies formally 
differ from one another. When determining whether to admit evidence that was 
obtained as a result of an unlawful search, courts consider “the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct.”102 Errors that are “at most negligent” do 
not warrant the exclusion of evidence,103 and whether suppression is 
appropriate “turns on the culpability of the police.”104 The Court’s exclusionary 
rule jurisprudence also incorporates notice standards that resemble standards 
used in qualified immunity and habeas corpus: “[E]vidence should be 
suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had 
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’”105 The good faith exception 
also appears to incorporate something like a requirement that the illegality of 
the particular officer’s conduct be apparent.106 The “good-faith inquiry” asks 
whether an officer “would have known that the search was illegal in light of all 
of the circumstances.”107 
Thus, the exclusionary rule, along with the qualified immunity defense, 
and the standards for post-conviction relief, has converged around the level of 
wrongdoing that justifies the remedies. In all three contexts, the notion is that 
good-faith, or reasonable actions, do not warrant remedies, while only 
unreasonable actions beyond any fair-minded disagreement do. 
2. Specific Convergence: Mistakes of Law, Changed Law, Causation, 
and Systemic Wrongdoing 
The standards for habeas, qualified immunity, and exclusion have also 
converged around more specific ideas, including (1) the relevance of legal 
change; (2) heightened standards for causation; and (3) exceptions for systemic 
wrongdoing. With respect to legal change, Davis v. United States held that an 
officer’s reliance on subsequently overruled precedent fell within the ambit of 
 
 101. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 
1786–87 (2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (same); 
Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 524 (2012). 
 102. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 
(1975)); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984) (“[A]n assessment of the flagrancy of the 
police misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus” of whether to apply the exclusionary 
rule.). 
 103. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. 
 104. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
 105. Id. at 143 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348–49 (1987)). 
 106. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (noting apparent unlawfulness “depend[s] on the 
circumstances of the particular case”). 
 107. Herring, 555 U.S. at 145 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23) (internal quotations 
removed). 
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the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.108 Thus, after Davis, when a 
court has mistakenly held that an officer’s actions were lawful, the good faith 
exception means that evidence obtained as a result of the officer’s illegal action 
will not be excluded. Because Davis did not present the question of “whether 
the exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a 
particular search is unsettled,”109 Davis aligned how the standards for damages, 
exclusion, and habeas treat cases where precedent does not clearly indicate an 
officer’s actions were unlawful. While Davis only addressed where a decision 
upholding the officials’ conduct is subsequently overruled, subsequent cases 
have expanded its holding.110 
Jennifer Laurin has explained how the standards for qualified immunity 
from damages and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule have 
converged in another respect—causation.111 Laurin notes how exclusionary 
rule jurisprudence has incorporated principles of causation from constitutional 
tort doctrine: “Both the ‘independent source’ doctrine and the ‘inevitable 
discovery’ rule are grounded in the premise that there must be a sufficient ‘but-
for’ causal connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and recovery 
of the challenged evidence.”112 So too is the “attenuation” doctrine, under 
which illegally obtained evidence that is removed enough in time and 
proximity from the constitutional violation is not excluded from criminal 
trials.113 
Something similar has occurred with the standard for habeas corpus, as it 
relates to both causation and attenuation. In ordinary criminal cases, 
constitutional violations warrant reversal unless the error is “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt,”114 which means that an error warrants reversal unless the 
error did not cause, or is too attenuated from, the jury’s ultimate 
determination.115 But the Court has fashioned a more demanding standard for 
causation in federal habeas proceedings, similar to the ways in which the 
exclusionary rule and the availability of damages in constitutional tort actions 
depend upon a clear showing that government illegality actually caused the 
other party harm. The Court rejected the idea that the harmless error principle 
should apply in habeas proceedings and instead adopted a standard where a 
writ is warranted only where the error “resulted in ‘actual prejudice,’” meaning 
 
 108. 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011). 
 109. Id. at 250 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 110. For example, a recently decided Eighth Circuit case said that exclusion is not warranted if 
a subsequent decision held that the evidence was lawful, even if a prior decision held that the evidence 
and police conduct was unlawful. United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 111. See Laurin, Trawling, supra note 7, at 711–19. 
 112. Id. at 718. 
 113. Id. at 718–19. 
 114. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
 115. Under the doctrine of structural error, some errors are so fundamental they warrant 
reversal even absent a finding that they affected the verdict or outcome. See generally Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907–1908 (2017) (describing categories of structural errors). 
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it had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict.”116 
Laurin further explains how the qualified immunity defense and the 
standard for excluding evidence in criminal trials have converged in how they 
approach systemic wrongdoing.117 Monell v. Department of Social Services 
held that plaintiffs could sue governmental entities for damages,118 but the 
Court has concluded in subsequent cases that entities are liable only where a 
formal governmental policy or custom violates the Constitution, or where a 
sufficiently widespread pattern of official conduct amounts to “deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons.”119 And, it has explained that “[a] pattern 
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily 
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference” in a failure to train 
employees.120 Further, the Court has required the constitutional violations to be 
similar in their facts (as opposed to general principles),121 much like the 
requirement that a party seeking a writ of habeas corpus or damages from an 
individual officer must identify a very similar case on point. The Court’s 
exclusionary rule jurisprudence has also moved toward a focus on systemic, 
widespread violations.122 Herring v. United States held that ordinary 
negligence on the part of an individual police officer does not warrant 
suppression, but explained that evidence of “systemic error” or “recurring or 
systemic negligence” might.123 And Utah v. Strieff relied on the same principle 
to conclude that suppression was not warranted where an unlawful stop was not 
“part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”124 
 
 116. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), held that, if a judge is uncertain 
as to whether the error affected the verdict, the court should find that it did, even under Brecht. The 
Court has also suggested a possible exception to that rule in cases that involve “affirmative evidence 
that state-court judges” were engaged in a pattern of constitutional violations, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 636, 
an idea that is similar to the approach to systemic liability in exclusionary-rule and constitutional-tort 
doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 117–130. 
 117. Laurin, Trawling, supra note 7, at 713–15. 
 118. 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). 
 119. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 
 120. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). 
 121. Id. at 62–63 (dismissing four reversals based on Brady violations because they “could not 
have put Connick on notice that the office’s Brady training was inadequate with respect to the sort of 
Brady violation at issue here. None of those cases involved failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime 
lab report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind.”). 
 122. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 n.8 (1987) (“If future empirical evidence ever 
should undermine” the assumption “that there exists a significant problem of legislators who perform 
their legislative duties with indifference to the constitutionality of the statutes they enact,” “our 
conclusions may be revised accordingly.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 918 (1984) 
(noting absence of systemic violations by judges or police officers). 
 123. 555 U.S. 135, 144, 147 (2009). 
 124. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
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The Court has likewise adopted common law rules about the scope of 
habeas review to focus on circumstances that present the potential for systemic, 
widespread constitutional violations.125 In Martinez v. Ryan126 and Trevino v. 
Thaler,127 the Court held that federal courts may reach the merits of ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims that were not adjudicated in state court, in 
states where defendants are formally required to bring ineffective-assistance 
claims in post-conviction proceedings, or where the design, structure, and 
operation of the system encourages them to do so as a matter of practice. 
Generally, federal habeas courts will not adjudicate the merits of claims that 
were not raised in state proceedings (absent certain exceptions like a 
constitutional violation),128 and the Court had previously declared that a state 
post-conviction attorney’s failure to raise a claim did not qualify as an 
exception that would allow a federal habeas court to hear the claim.129 But in 
Martinez and Trevino, the Court reasoned that requiring all defendants to raise 
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in post-conviction proceedings, 
where defendants have no constitutional right to an attorney, created too great a 
risk that the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim would never be heard by 
any court.130 Thus, in the habeas context as well, the Court has fashioned rules 
that allow for easier recovery in cases where there is the potential for systemic 
errors. 
C. Causes of Action Against Federal Officials 
The standard that establishes when an individual has a cause of action to 
sue federal officials for damages recently converged on the standards for the 
application of the exclusionary rule, the issuance of writs of habeas corpus, and 
the scope of officials’ qualified immunity from damages. No statute affords 
individuals a cause of action to sue federal officials for constitutional violations 
in the same way that section 1983 provides a cause of action to sue state 
officials for constitutional violations.131 But under Bivens v. Six Unknown 
 
 125. See supra note 116 (discussing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 
 126. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
 127. 569 U.S. 413 (2013). 
 128. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747–48 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
84–85 (1977). 
 129. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753–54. 
 130. Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1919–20 (reasoning that Martinez applies because “Texas courts in 
effect have directed defendants to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on collateral, 
rather than on direct, review”); Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12 (“To present a claim of ineffective assistance 
at trial in accordance with the State’s procedures, then, a prisoner likely needs an effective attorney.”); 
cf. Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 563–64 (describing Martinez and Trevino as decisions “based on 
concatenated error”). Davila v. Davis limited the reach of Martinez and Trevino, holding that the rule 
in those cases did not extend to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. 137 S. Ct. 2058 
(2017). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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Federal Narcotics Agents, courts can imply a cause of action against federal 
officials for constitutional violations in some circumstances.132 
The Court’s recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi made the convergence 
between the Bivens standard and the qualified immunity, habeas, and 
exclusionary-rule standards more explicit.133 Before Abbasi, Correctional 
Services Corporation v. Malesko had introduced the idea that courts will not 
“extend Bivens liability” and recognize a cause of action “to any new context 
or new category of defendants.”134 Abbasi defined what the Court would 
consider a “new context” for purposes of Bivens, such that a court should be 
cautious before implying a cause of action, and likely not imply one at all.135 
First, Abbasi stated that whether a case presents a new Bivens context should be 
determined with reference to “previous Bivens cases decided by this Court,” 
i.e., the Supreme Court,136 similar to the standards for obtaining writs of habeas 
corpus or overcoming officials’ qualified immunity from damages.137 Second, 
and more importantly, Abbasi defined “new contexts” in a way that mirrors the 
level of specificity (and cautions against generality) in habeas corpus and 
qualified immunity. Abbasi stated that the “proper test for determining whether 
a case presents a new Bivens context” is whether “the case is different in a 
meaningful way from previous Bivens cases” of the Supreme Court.138 
“Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are 
meaningful enough,” the Court offered “some examples” for “instructive” 
purposes.139 A case may meaningfully differ, and thus be a new context, 
“because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; 
the generality or specificity of the official action;” and “the extent of judicial 
guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to 
be confronted.”140 The last factor, in particular, focuses on the specificity with 
which prior cases have spoken to the legality of the officers’ actions, much like 
the qualified immunity and habeas standards.141 
The Court in Abbasi also observed that “even a modest extension is still 
an extension,”142 and explained its prior cases in a way that made clear most 
 
 132. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). But while both Bivens and qualified immunity relate to a particular 
remedy—damages—the two doctrines do not perform the same function or operate at the same stage 
of a case. Bivens concerns the availability of a cause of action for damages against federal officials, 
whereas qualified immunity represents the standard for ultimately obtaining damages against such 
officials. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 734–35 (2011) (explaining the different 
functions of a cause of action and qualified immunity). 
 133. See 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 134. 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). 
 135. 137 S. Ct. at 1856. 
 136. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 84–100. 
 138. 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 139. Id. at 1859–60. 
 140. Id. at 1860. 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 28–34, 64–66. 
 142. 137 S. Ct. at 1864. 
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contexts would be new.143 The Court provided Malesko as one example.144 A 
case prior to Malesko had recognized a cause of action under the Eighth 
Amendment against federal prison officials for their failure to provide adequate 
medical treatment.145 Moreover, the plaintiff in Malesko sought a private cause 
of action against a “private prison operator in almost parallel 
circumstances”146—for the operator’s failure to provide adequate medical 
treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But the Malesko Court 
concluded that the plaintiff sought a cause of action in a new context—against 
the corporate prison operator, rather than the individual officer responsible for 
the wrongdoing.147 
Abbasi also expanded on another aspect of Bivens doctrine—the “special 
factors” analysis—in a way that harkens to ideas in qualified immunity and 
habeas corpus. Previous Bivens cases had made clear that courts will not 
recognize a cause of action against federal officials where there are “special 
factors counseling hesitation” in doing so.148 Prior cases had also suggested 
that, when evaluating whether a context was new, a Bivens action might not be 
“a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy.”149 Expanding that cautionary 
note, Abbasi declared that a special factor counseling hesitation against a 
damages action is if the “claims would call into question the formulation and 
implementation of a general policy” and “major elements of the Government’s 
whole response” to an event.150 Abbasi also stated that “Bivens is not designed 
to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates . . . under a theory of 
respondeat superior.”151 That statement resembles the standard for liability 
against municipal officers under section 1983, where the Court has also 
rejected respondeat superior liability in favor of one that requires “a municipal 
‘policy’ or ‘custom.’”152 
 
 143. Lower courts have picked this up, dismissing several claims for damages against 
government officials. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (relying on Abbasi to 
conclude there was no cause of action); Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017) (same); Perez 
v. Diaz, No. 13-cv-1417-WQH-BGS (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (same). But see Rodriguez v. Swartz, 
No. 15-16410, Dkt. 116-1 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2018) (inferring cause of action in circumstances similar to 
Hernandez, 885 F.3d 811). 
 144. See 534 U.S. 61, 70, 70 n.4 (2001). 
 145. Carlson v. Greene, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 146. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 147. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70, 70 n.4 (2001). 
 148. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2006) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 
(1983)). 
 149. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74. 
 150. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–61; see also id. at 1862 (speculating that “high-level policies 
will attract the attention of Congress,” and that “when Congress fails to provide a damages remedy in 
circumstances like these, it is much more difficult to believe that ‘congressional inaction’ was 
‘inadvertent’”); id. (noting that “respondents instead challenge large-scale policy decisions”). 
 151. Id. at 1860 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). 
 152. Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 
1500 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1477 
II. 
REMEDIAL, DOCTRINAL, AND THEORETICAL COLLAPSE 
This Section critically discusses the implications of the remedial 
convergence described in Part I. Part II.A begins, however, with some of the 
normative problems that arise from the Court raising the standards of relief for 
all of the different remedies discussed in Part I. When almost every 
adjudication of a right is refracted through the same, demanding remedial 
standard, the remedial system effectively narrows the contours of the 
underlying rights themselves. And because the overarching remedial standard 
is primarily backward-looking and focuses on existing case law, it impedes 
federal courts’ ability to develop new constitutional rights, at least in the 
context of policing, where the remedial doctrines predominantly operate.153 
Policing decisions, however, may be made with little political oversight and 
accountability, and they have uneven distributional consequences, primarily 
burdening poor communities and communities of color. The collapse of federal 
remedies in cases related to policing only further exacerbates these disparities. 
Parts II.B–D assess the reasoning behind the mechanism that the Court 
has used to raise the remedial standards—convergence. Convergence is 
inconsistent with another feature of remedial doctrine, which maintains that 
courts should withhold one remedy because another remedy could serve as a 
substitute. Because the standards for obtaining the remedies have converged on 
one another, withholding one remedy will often mean that the other remedies 
are equally unavailable. The convergence in the remedial standards also 
challenges the rationale behind substituting one remedy for another—that the 
remedies are different enough such that one remedy is better suited than the 
others. But the remedies do differ from one another, and so the convergence in 
the remedial standards results in a lack of fit with the remedies themselves. 
Moreover, in practice, convergence has functioned as a one-way ratchet, under 
which the government uniformly benefits from the convergence but the party 
seeking relief does not. 
A. Remedial Collapse 
This Section surveys how systematically raising the standards for 
obtaining various remedies can limit the effectiveness of those remedies and 
restrict access to federal courts for claims related to policing that should be 
aired for a variety of reasons. 
 
 153. The immunity doctrines operate to the benefit of executive officers; requests for writs of 
habeas corpus are premised on violations of constitutional criminal procedure, and the exclusionary 
rule applies in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, that remedial convergence primarily operates to 
limit federal courts’ oversight of constitutional violations that occur in the course of policing should 
give one pause. 
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1. The Purposes of Remedies 
Systematically ratcheting up the standards for obtaining various remedies 
detracts from their purported purpose—deterring violations of existing 
substantive rights. The Court has justified all of the remedies discussed in this 
Article—the exclusionary rule, post-conviction review (particularly of state 
criminal convictions), and damages actions against government officials—as 
ways to deter officers from engaging in constitutional violations.154 And 
Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have suggested that while remedies need 
not be available in all cases, the Constitution might require “a general structure 
of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the bounds of 
law.”155 
The path toward remedial convergence and collapse raises questions 
about whether courts have the ability to oversee and maintain a remedial 
system that serves the stated goal of adequately keeping the government within 
the bounds of the law.156 But even if courts could ensure an overall system of 
remedies that is able to effectuate that goal, the current state of the doctrine is 
probably inadequate to the task. Systematically ratcheting up the standard for 
obtaining different remedies frustrates the doctrine’s capacity to advance 
existing substantive rights and recognize new ones.157 The substantive law 
regarding a particular right is mediated through the same standard that focuses 
on systemic wrongdoing—conduct that a previous Supreme Court case has 
held unlawful—and (perhaps) normatively unambiguous conduct. 
Because every adjudication of a right is refracted through that remedial 
standard, the convergence among the different remedies narrows the 
mechanism that is supposed to be constraining government officials—the 
availability of remedies for misconduct. The Court’s existing account of 
remedies maintains that the availability of remedies is what incentivizes the 
government to follow the law. If that account is correct, then there is no 
existing mechanism that encourages the government to follow the law on 
substantive rights as such. Rather, there is a system that encourages compliance 
with a narrow subset of the broader edifice of constitutional rights. The larger 
edifice of constitutional rights is not doing meaningful work; the constitutional 
 
 154. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231–32 (“[T]his Court created the 
exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction.”); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (“The purpose of Bivens is to deter 
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations.”); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 
21 (1980) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976)) (“It is almost axiomatic that the 
threat of damages has a deterrent effect.”); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 413 (1990) (citing 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)). 
 155. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 53, at 1736. 
 156. See infra text accompanying notes 309–314 (on differing preferences of different Justices 
on damages versus equitable remedies); Laurin, Trawling, supra note 7, at 741 (raising concerns about 
courts’ ability to interchange different remedies to arrive at an optimal level of deterrence). 
 157. The doctrine does, however, serve other purposes, including not deterring state actors from 
socially beneficial conduct. 
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rules as they are mediated through the remedial standard that operates across 
different domains is. Thus, if the Court is correct that the availability of 
remedies incentivizes compliance, then officers are incentivized to comply only 
with rights whose scope is defined by the remedial standard. 
The standard on which the different remedies have converged also 
impedes federal courts’ ability to develop new constitutional rights, at least in 
contexts such as policing where the remedial doctrines predominantly 
operate.158 The remedial standards in both habeas corpus and suits for damages 
are backward-looking and focus on existing precedent: The standards place a 
premium on identifying cases that have already been decided, cases that 
already recognize a constitutional right, and cases that already define the 
contours of that constitutional right as applied to a very specific set of facts.159 
And the remedial standard for exclusion of evidence focuses on wanton or 
intentional wrongdoing whose unlawfulness is apparent, or wrongdoing that 
occurs on a large scale. These standards make it more difficult to address or 
account for government practices that evolve, or new technologies that 
emerge.160 Policing practices, for example, now include things like gang 
injunctions, which weren’t used before.161 Police also have access to network 
technologies that have the capacity to locate individuals or monitor their 
preferences.162 The currently operative remedial standard does not reflect how 
government practices are constantly changing. Rather, by foreclosing remedies 
in cases that present new facts or new applications of existing principles, the 
remedial standard restricts the development of new constitutional rights and the 
refinement of existing rights applied to new circumstances. 
2. Remedies for Particular Violations 
The remedial doctrines discussed in this Article arise primarily in the 
context of executive violations of constitutional rights, and policing violations 
in particular.163 Accordingly, remedial convergence should give one pause for 
several reasons. First, the conduct of policing is not currently subject to much 
democratic control or accountability. For several decades scholars have 
 
 158. The Court can still recognize new rights in certain postures—such as where the reason 
underlying a decision to admit evidence turns on the scope of the right, rather than application of the 
exclusionary rule. That occurs, for example, when a court says the government’s conduct didn’t 
amount to a search or seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 159. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), arguably exacerbates how qualified immunity 
can impede the development of new rights by allowing courts to decide whether a right is clearly 
established before attempting to decide whether the right has been violated. Id. at 233–36. 
 160. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1427–47 (2017) 
(documenting various reasons government practices change). 
 161. See Wesley F. Harward, Note, A New Understanding of Gang Injunctions, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2015) (highlighting the origins of gang injunctions in the late 1990s). 
 162. See, e.g., Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 112–21 
(2018). 
 163. See supra note 153. 
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observed and critiqued the amount of discretion there is in policing—there is 
very little legislative direction for policing and also, thus far, very little 
administrative regulation of policing.164 More recently, Barry Friedman and 
Maria Ponomarenko surveyed how policing decisions are made with little 
transparency or evaluation.165 The result is a kind of democratic deficit in 
policing—executive officers who are engaged in policing possess substantial 
amounts of authority, but they are neither accountable themselves to the people 
via elections nor subject to democratic inputs or oversight through legislative 
or administrative limitations on their authority.166 Partially due to these reasons, 
the presumption of constitutionality and the skepticism of judicial review may 
be less applicable to the actions of state and federal officials.167 
While ex ante democratic oversight of policing may be ideal, judicial 
oversight can function as a second-best mechanism for oversight and 
accountability and potentially supplement more democratized policing. Judicial 
oversight offers a mechanism to provide information about the government’s 
policies and subjects the government’s public justifications for its policies to 
some scrutiny. For example, John Lennon’s lawsuits against the government 
revealed official documents that established a deferred action policy for 
deportations, under which the then-Immigration and Naturalization Services 
would designate certain individuals as “nonpriority” for removal.168 A lawsuit 
challenging an individual’s placement on the United States’ “terrorist 
watchlist” revealed that the government had explicitly and secretly departed 
from the standard for keeping individuals on the watch list that it had publicly 
adopted and embraced.169 
A second reason why limiting the availability of remedies in policing-
related cases may be problematic is because policing has uneven distributional 
consequences, and so displacing remedies in policing-related cases replicates 
and institutionalizes those disparities in the federal courts. One of the reasons 
 
 164. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 
(1969); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 423 
(1974); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972). 
 165. Barry Friedman & Maria Pnomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1832–52 (2015). 
 166. More recent work has built on the critiques alluded to in infra note 224 to propose 
additional legislative or administrative oversight on policing. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth 
Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016); Friedman & 
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, supra note 165; Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, 
Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1724–25, 1758–70 
(2014). 
 167. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 76–82 (1969) (outlining arguments against presumption for certain kinds of executive actions). 
 168. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 
9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 247–48 (2010); Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the 
Immigration Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979). 
 169. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Shirin 
Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1566–69 (2016). 
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the Supreme Court constitutionalized criminal procedure in the early 20th 
century was that southern states were subjecting African Americans to abuses 
in the criminal justice system.170 Today, people of color bear the 
disproportionate brunt of policing.171 Studies have documented how African 
Americans are stopped more frequently by police,172 how African-American 
communities are subject to more policing173 and how African Americans 
stopped by the police are searched more frequently than non-African 
Americans who are stopped by the police.174 The greater frequency with which 
African-American communities encounter the police results in a greater 
frequency of African Americans experiencing police violence. If one group 
more frequently encounters the police, that group frequently will also 
experience police mistreatment more frequently.175 Moreover, there is evidence 
 
 170. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 764–66 (1991) (documenting “physically coerced confessions,” discrimination in 
jury selection, denial of counsel, “and mob-dominated trials”). 
 171. See generally Ted R. Miller et al., Perils of Police Action: A Cautionary Tale from US 
Data Sets, 23 INJ. PREVENTION 27, 30 (2017), http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/23/1/27 
[https://perma.cc/J7SC-QSD8] (finding higher stop and arrest rate for racial minorities than whites); 
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the New Policing, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539 (2016) (showing a study that minority neighborhoods face more police 
surveillance and preemptive policing); Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows 
Revisited: Race and Order Maintenance Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in EXPLORING RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White 
eds., 2010) (same). 
 172. See The Stanford Open Policing Project, Findings (November 1, 2017), 
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings/ [https://perma.cc/SJH7-WFFN] (“[O]fficers generally stop 
black drivers at higher rates than white drivers.”); Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of 
Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, https://5harad.com/papers/traffic-stops.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z6DS-MZWS] (same). 
 173. See, e.g., JOCELYN M. POLLOCK, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 44 (2011) (describing FBI statistics that in 2009, over 40 percent of arrests for 
vagrancy and 68.6% of arrests for illegal gambling were of African Americans, who represented 13% 
of the U.S. population); Fagan, Street Stops, supra note 171, at 309, 311, 323–25, 331–32 
(documenting certain police practices as being concentrated in neighborhoods that are primarily 
African American). 
 174. See Edmund Andrews, Stanford Researchers Develop New Statistical Test that Shows 
Racial Profiling in Police Traffic Stops, STANFORD NEWS (June 28, 2016), 
http://news.stanford.edu/2016/06/28/stanford-researchers-develop-new-statistical-test-shows-racial-
profiling-police-traffic-stops/ [https://perma.cc/S62L-ZEPM] (“By analyzing data from 4.5 million 
traffic stops in 100 North Carolina cities, Stanford researchers have found that police in that state are 
more likely to search black and Hispanic motorists, using a lower threshold of suspicion, than when 
they stop white or Asian drivers.”); Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING 
TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCX2-QRVB] (“Relatively more 
black drivers . . . than white . . . and Hispanic . . . drivers were pulled over in a traffic stop during their 
most recent contact with police. . . . White drivers were both ticketed and searched at lower rates than 
black and Hispanic drivers.”); Pierson, supra note 172 (making similar findings). 
 175. Much has been written about the forces that contribute to the violence in police practices 
generally. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S 
POLICE FORCES (2013). 
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that people of different groups may not be treated equally. Research on implicit 
bias has revealed associations between community disorder and race, as well as 
criminality and race.176 
A similar dynamic has occurred in national security policy, an area where 
executive officials receive additional deference under both qualified immunity 
and Bivens doctrine. Applying critical insights about ordinary police practices, 
Amna Akbar has explained how the federal government’s policy choices in the 
national security context “increase the presence of law enforcement in already 
overpoliced communities” and “further marginalize” the American-Muslim 
community “on the grounds of its difference.”177 Both federal and state 
counter-terrorism policies are premised on a narrative that purports to explain 
how Muslims are radicalized, but, as Akbar explains, by focusing on Islam and 
Muslims, the federal government’s policies necessarily direct policing attention 
toward “visible markers and geographies” associated with Muslims.178 
Investigative and monitoring resources are “almost exclusively focused on 
Muslims,”179 which, together with the theory of radicalization, cements 
Muslims as “figure[s] of legitimate police scrutiny.”180 
 
 176. See L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 
(2012); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial 
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); see also Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Perception of Disorder, 24 FOCUS 7 (2005), 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc241b.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPB-FWDZ]; 
Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 878 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006) (surveying implicit bias research); Jerry Kang, 
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing mechanisms by which implicit 
biases are reinforced); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 
(2012) (identifying implicit bias against criminal defendants); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency 
and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011); L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, 
Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 279–82 (2012) (explaining 
relationship between racial profiling and police violence on the one hand and racial stereotypes and 
racial biases); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 115, 124–31 (2014) (same); L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from 
Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2970 (2015) (same). 
 177. Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 833, 843–44 
(2015). 
 178. Id. at 848–49 (describing reports of radicalization that are “entirely focused on Muslims”). 
 179. Id. at 876; see also Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept, 54(2) 
RACE & CLASS 3, 5–6 (2012). 
 180. Akbar, supra note 177, at 881, 885–86. There is also considerable evidence of bias toward 
and profiling of Muslims in national security policing. See Stefan Bonino, How Discrimination 
Against Muslims at Airports Actually Hurts the Fight Against Terrorism, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/26/how-discrimination-
against-muslims-at-airports-actually-hurts-the-fight-against-terrorism/?utm_term=.fe7e613a0e9c 
[https://perma.cc/7MN6-XCKJ]; Sahar Aziz, Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Is Poisoning 
Muslim Americans’ Trust, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2012), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/21/racial-profiling-law-
enforcement-muslim-americans [https://perma.cc/HDE3-YRP3]. 
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Scholars have identified similar trends in immigration-related policing. 
The substantive content of immigration law has historically incorporated 
considerations of race and nationality,181 and the Supreme Court has also 
explicitly sanctioned reliance on proxies for nationality, including race, in 
immigration enforcement.182 Partially due to this reason, immigration-related 
policing can and does impose greater burdens on certain populations, 
particularly Latinx communities.183 
A body of remedial doctrines that limits access to federal courts in cases 
of policing and executive officials means that the claims of constitutional right 
that are ousted from the federal courts will more often than not be claims 
brought by and claims that could benefit poor communities of color.184 The 
remedial doctrines, in other words, effectuate policing’s distributional 
consequences in another forum, and through another institution, which could 
contribute to the “legal estrangement . . . [felt] in the communities that are most 
affected” by the policing of the legal system.185 
B. Remedial Convergence and Substitution 
1. Convergence as a Formal Barrier to Remedies 
The convergence of the standards governing the availability of various 
remedies complicates a major premise of existing remedial doctrines—namely, 
that one remedy should be withheld in favor of another, more suitable remedy. 
If the applicable standards for all of the remedies have converged on one 
another, then the fact that one remedy is unavailable will mean that other 
 
 181. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacon, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of 
Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 348–59 (2007). 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975) (reasoning that 
“Mexican appearance” is a “relevant factor” border patrol officers may consider when conducting 
stops); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (similarly reasoning that “apparent 
Mexican ancestry” can be the grounds for referring individual to further immigration inspection); 
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999) (concluding that federal 
courts generally lack jurisdiction to decide claims of selective enforcement of immigration law, except 
in cases of outrageous discrimination). 
 183. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333, 353–54 (2013) (outlining legal challenges based on evidence of selective 
enforcement practices on the basis of race); Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial 
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
367, 367–68 (2013) (explaining how immigration enforcement generates selective burdens on the 
basis of race and ethnicity); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 29 (2004) (“In the fervor to locate and deport undocumented Mexican citizens, 
Mexican Americans, often stereotyped as ‘foreigners’ by the national community, can fall into the 
enforcement net.”). 
 184. Aziz Z. Huq and Genevieve Lakier also observed this trend in Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1525, 1574–80 (2018). 
 185. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE 
L.J. 2054, 2130–31, 2143–44 (2017). 
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remedies, which are governed by similar standards, will also likely be 
unavailable. 
a. Exclusion From Criminal Trial  
The Court frequently cites the availability of other remedies as a reason 
not to exclude illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials.186 Hudson v. 
Michigan explained that the exclusionary rule was established at a time when 
civil suits against individual officers were not available because Bivens and 
Monroe v. Pape187 had not yet been decided (Monroe authorized damages suits 
against individual, state officers who were not acting pursuant to an official 
state policy).188 The Court then reasoned that the alternative remedies made the 
exclusionary rule less necessary.189 The Court reasoned similarly in Utah v. 
Strieff, when it rejected the defendant’s claim that not excluding the illegally 
obtained evidence would embolden officers to engage in illegal stops—“[s]uch 
wanton conduct,” the Court explained, “would expose police to civil 
liability.”190 But if exclusion is not warranted because the officers acted 
reasonably in light of existing law, then damages would not be available either 
because the standards for the two remedies have converged.191 The Court 
deployed similar analysis in Nix v. Williams, which concerned the exclusion of 
evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.192 Invoking reasoning from Bivens cases, the Court explained that 
suppression was not necessary because “civil liability” was a “[s]ignificant 
disincentive[] [for police] to obtain[] evidence illegally.”193 
b. Habeas Corpus/Post-Conviction Review  
Similarly, in habeas cases, the Court has explained that the demanding 
standard for issuing writs of habeas corpus does not leave prisoners without a 
remedy. In a decision interpreting AEDPA to bar the issuance of a writ, the 
Court reasoned that constitutional violations can be remedied by state courts 
who will exclude the constitutionally objectionable evidence, and the 
 
 186. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006); id. at 597 (noting that 
defendant’s argument “[a]ssum[es] . . . that civil suit is not an effective deterrent”). 
 187. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 188. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597 (“We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary 
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different contexts and long 
ago. That would be forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that 
existed almost half a century ago.”); id. (noting that “Monroe v. Pape . . . was decided the same Term 
as Mapp” and that “[c]itizens whose Fourth Amendments rights were violated by federal officers 
could not bring suit until 10 years after Mapp, with this Court’s decision in Bivens”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). 
 191. The standard for municipal liability has evolved to encompass a deliberate indifference 
standard. See supra text accompanying notes 117–124. 
 192. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 193. Id. at 446. 
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availability of Supreme Court review will ensure that state courts do so.194 It is 
reasonable to question whether the Supreme Court has the capacity to ensure 
that state courts are correctly applying the exclusionary rule in light of the tens 
of thousands of petitions that are filed at the Court each year.195 But putting 
that question aside, there are consequences to the convergence of the standard 
for habeas corpus, which focuses on the reasonableness of a state court’s 
decision in light of Supreme Court case law, and the standard for excluding 
evidence from criminal trials, which similarly focuses on the reasonableness of 
an officer’s actions in light of Supreme Court case law. The convergence can, 
in some cases, mean that if habeas corpus is not warranted, exclusion may not 
be warranted either, or at least not warranted enough to make the Supreme 
Court take the unusual step of deciding to hear a case solely to correct an 
erroneous decision of a state court.196 
The Court’s decision in Davis v. United States increased the possibility 
that the exclusion of evidence would not be warranted in cases where writs of 
habeas corpus should not issue. Davis held that illegally obtained evidence 
should not be excluded if, at the time of the officer’s conduct, a case had 
erroneously held that the evidence was lawfully admitted at the defendant’s 
trial.197 Davis could mean that, in some cases, exclusion would be foreclosed 
where habeas is not warranted, since the existence of some judicial authority 
suggesting that either the officer’s action or the state court decision were lawful 
would mean the state court decision was not an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Supreme Court law. While Davis involved a Fourth 
Amendment claim, which is not cognizable in habeas corpus,198 there is a risk 
that a similar result could occur for Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations 
because the Court has incorporated aspects of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule into both Fifth and Sixth Amendment doctrine. For example, 
Fourth Amendment standards of causation and attenuation apply to evidence 
that was obtained as a result of a Fifth or Sixth Amendment violation.199 Those 
 
 194. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 41 (2011) (“Before applying for federal habeas, he missed 
two opportunities to obtain relief under Gray: After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his 
appeal, he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court, which would almost certainly 
have produced a remand in light of the intervening Gray decision.”). 
 195. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas 
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2055–91 (1992) (relying on this point to 
argue that habeas review substitutes for appeals to the Supreme Court). 
 196. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the 
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 
law.”); Stephen M. Shapiro et al., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 352 (10th ed. 2013) (“[E]rror 
correction . . . is outside the mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among the ‘compelling 
reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of certiorari.”). 
 197. 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 198. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
 199. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442, 443–44 (1984) (noting that fruits-of-the-
poisonous-tree doctrine from the Fourth Amendment applies to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and 
incorporating independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines related to causation to the Sixth 
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standards turn in part on the flagrancy of the officials’ conduct, and an 
official’s conduct is not likely to be flagrant if it was specifically permitted by 
(an albeit incorrectly decided) judicial decision. Thus, when deciding whether 
to exclude evidence from trial, a case suggesting that the evidence was lawfully 
obtained could, under Davis, mean that exclusion is not warranted under the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. And the existence of a case 
suggesting that the defendant’s trial was lawful also means that a writ of habeas 
corpus should not issue either.200 
c. Bivens Cause of Action 
Since its inception, the existence of a Bivens cause of action has been tied 
to the availability of other remedies. In Bivens, the Court recognized a cause of 
action against federal officials for a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Part of Bivens’s reasoning 
was that state tort law may not offer remedies for all Fourth Amendment 
violations, and that Congress had not provided “another remedy, equally 
effective.”201 Justice Harlan’s separate opinion likewise invoked the absence of 
other remedies as a reason to imply a cause of action: “[A]ssuming Bivens’ 
innocence of the crime charged, the ‘exclusionary rule’ is simply irrelevant. 
For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”202 Subsequent cases 
have turned these statements into a reason not to recognize a cause of action 
where other remedies could deter unlawful action, such as administrative 
remedies or state tort remedies.203 Relying on these cases, Abbasi held that the 
 
Amendment); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 620–22 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying 
standard that favors admission of statements absent an “interrogation technique . . . used in a 
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning” in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (noting that “the absence of any coercion or improper tactics,” i.e., 
flagrant or bad faith conduct, counseled against suppression of statement made in violation of 
Miranda). 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
 201. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
392–93, 397 (1971). 
 202. Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 203. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 125 (2012) (“[S]tate tort law provides an 
‘alternative, existing process’ capable of protecting the constitutional interests at stake.”); Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 553 (2007) (“In sum, Robbins has an administrative, and ultimately a judicial, 
process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints.”); Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (declining to recognize a cause of action against a prison because suits against 
prison officials sufficed to deter); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (“Congress, 
however, has not failed to provide meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated 
as respondents were. Indeed, the system for protecting their rights is, if anything, considerably more 
elaborate than the civil service system considered in Bush.”); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) 
(citing “the history of the development of civil service remedies and the comprehensive nature of the 
remedies currently available” as a reason not to imply a cause of action); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296, 303 (1983) (citing the availability of “intramilitary administrative procedure” as a reason not 
to imply a cause of action). 
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mere possibility of another remedy may suffice as a reason not to imply a cause 
of action.204 
d. Qualified Immunity/Damages Actions 
In damages actions against state officials, courts have used the availability 
of other remedies to address concerns that qualified immunity fails to remedy 
constitutional violations.205 For example, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court 
held that qualified immunity doctrine does not require courts to first determine 
whether a constitutional right was violated before assessing whether the right is 
clearly established.206 Pearson rejected the argument that allowing courts to 
dismiss a claim on the basis that a right is not clearly established would stunt 
the development of constitutional law or leave constitutional violations un-
remedied, because “[m]ost of the constitutional issues that are presented in 
[section] 1983 damages actions and Bivens cases also arise in cases in which 
that defense is not available, such as criminal cases and [section] 1983 cases 
against a municipality.”207 But in criminal cases, the standard for excluding 
evidence now incorporates much of the standard for overcoming immunity in 
damages suits. Thus, if a right is not clearly established, it is also likely that the 
evidence would have been obtained in good faith; the latter would mean that 
the exclusionary rule is off the table, and the former would mean that damages 
are also unavailable. Likewise, while immunity may not be formally available 
in suits against municipalities, the heightened standard for municipal liability—
which requires an official policy or custom that reflects deliberate 
indifference—closely tracks the standard for qualified immunity, which also 
largely requires indifference toward existing law.208 
The convergence in the different remedial standards thus undermines the 
Court’s reassurances that another remedy will substitute for the remedy the 
Court has denied, because convergence means that all remedies will effectively 
be displaced when the court denies one remedy. 
 
 204. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 (2017) (explaining that the Court having “left 
open the question whether [the petitioners] might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus” was a reason not to imply a cause of action for damages). 
 205. There are also examples where the Court or individual Justices have suggested that other 
remedies besides damages actions are the preferable way to address particular constitutional violations. 
See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Damages actions are not available for violations of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. They are also not available for the failure to administer Miranda 
warnings in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); id. 
at 790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The identification of a Miranda 
violation and its consequences, then, ought to be determined at trial. The exclusion of unwarned 
statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy.”). 
 206. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 207. Id. at 242. 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 117–120; see also Fred Smith, Local Sovereign 
Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 430–38 (2016) (outlining how municipal liability shares 
conceptual roots with qualified immunity, serves similar purposes, and has parallel structures). 
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2. Convergence as a Challenge to Substitution’s Premises 
The convergence of the different remedial standards challenges remedial 
substitution in another way as well. Convergence challenges a key premise of 
the effort to substitute one remedy for another—namely that the remedies are 
so meaningfully different from one another that courts should deny the 
availability of one remedy because another remedy is preferable. 
Consider the different reasons the Court has given for why each particular 
remedy is disfavored. In cases about the exclusion of evidence from criminal 
trials, the Court often cites the “substantial social costs exacted by the 
exclusionary rule” as a reason to deny the exclusion of evidence.209 Because 
the application of the exclusionary rule results in evidence not being admitted 
at trial, it “impede[s] . . . the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.”210 The 
exclusionary rule may also “set[] the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”211 
The former is unique to exclusion; the latter does not apply to suits for damages 
or injunctive relief, whether the suits are against individual officers or 
entities.212 The latter also may not apply to some writs of habeas corpus that are 
predicated on the violations of constitutional rights that affect the likelihood 
that an innocent person has been convicted, such as ineffective assistance of 
counsel,213 the prosecution’s failure to disclose material, exculpatory 
evidence,214 or the prosecution’s failure to present evidence from which a jury 
could reasonably convict a defendant.215 
The Court cites a different array of concerns about damages actions and 
writs of habeas corpus. The “social costs” of “permitting damages suits” 
“include[] the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing 
litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties”—i.e., 
deter conduct in the field that should not be deterred.216 Damages actions 
“would necessarily require inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the 
discussions and deliberations that led to the policies and governmental acts 
being challenged,” which could “prevent [officers] . . . from devoting the time 
and effort required for the proper discharge of their duties.”217 In habeas cases, 
the Court has explained that writs of habeas corpus to state court prisoners raise 
 
 209. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984). 
 210. Id. at 907 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). 
 211. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
 212. See also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009) (explaining costs of the 
exclusionary rule as “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free” and citing the “rule’s 
costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives”). 
 213. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 214. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 215. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
 216. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see also Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 
183, 195 (1984) (citing concerns about “public officials’ effective performance of their duties”). 
 217. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017). 
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federalism concerns—they frustrate “the States’ sovereign power to punish 
offenders”218 and risk “friction” between the state and federal courts.219 
It might be the case that there are unique concerns with all of the 
particular remedies, but that each remedy should be limited in some fashion. 
There are also overlapping concerns with some of the remedies—both writs of 
habeas corpus and the application of the exclusionary rule, for example, may 
result in some guilty defendants going free and may frustrate the government’s 
ability to punish an individual. But it is not clear that the different concerns 
with each remedy would justify the exact same restrictions on all of the various 
remedies or would justify the same restrictions on two remedies that raise 
entirely different concerns. 
3. Disingenuous Substitution? 
The simultaneous convergence and ratcheting up of the remedial 
standards, coupled with the Court’s insistence that different remedies can 
substitute for one another, makes the Court’s gestures toward substitution 
appear somewhat disingenuous. The Court’s commitment to faithful 
substitution is also questionable given its failure to account for independent, 
formal legal standards on the availability of alternative remedies or practical 
limits governing the availability of the alternative remedies. 
Abbasi, for example, exemplifies how the Court holds out another remedy 
as a substitute while overlooking the formal, legal limits on the purportedly 
available remedy. Abbasi involved a group of undocumented individuals, many 
of them South Asian, Arab, and/or Muslim, who were detained by the FBI in 
the course of the FBI’s investigation in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.220 The FBI encountered the individuals in the course of 
investigating public tips and held them without bail at a detention center, where 
they allegedly were held in tiny cells for over twenty-three hours a day, 
subjected to light twenty-four hours a day, shackled and strip-searched, and 
subjected to physical abuse.221 Abbasi held that the plaintiffs did not need a 
cause of action to sue for damages because they could have sought injunctive 
relief.222 
The problem, however, is that City of Los Angeles v. Lyons held that the 
standards for establishing standing to challenge a government policy differ 
 
 218. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (quoting Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 
538, 555–56 (1998)). 
 219. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 687 (1993) (justifying retroactivity bar and quoting 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491, 491 n.31 (1976)). 
 220. 137 S. Ct. at 1851–52. 
 221. Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 228–31 (2d Cir. 2015), rev’d, Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843. 
 222. 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63. 
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depending on whether a plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief or damages.223 If a 
plaintiff is seeking damages, the plaintiff need only establish that they were 
injured by the government conduct. But if a plaintiff seeks injunctive or 
declaratory relief, the plaintiff must establish that they will likely be injured by 
the government conduct they complain of.224 Applied to Abbasi, it is difficult to 
see how the plaintiffs could have established that they were likely to be 
detained under the FBI’s policy of holding certain individuals of interest before 
the plaintiffs were actually taken into custody. Even if the plaintiffs knew about 
the policy announcing detentions, they would not have known the conditions in 
which they would have been held while detained. Even if the plaintiffs were 
mistreated in detention, they might not have known that they would be 
mistreated again. Nor would the plaintiffs have been able to establish on what 
basis the FBI was choosing to detain people before the FBI actually detained 
them, and several of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims alleged that they were 
detained on the basis of their race, nationality, and religion.225 
Abbasi’s conclusion that the plaintiffs would have been able to sue for 
equitable relief is also complicated by recent cases that have concluded that 
plaintiffs are not necessarily entitled to an implied cause of action for equitable 
relief in the absence of congressional authorization. For example, Armstrong v. 
Exceptional Child Center held that the Supremacy Clause does not contain an 
implied cause of action that allows plaintiffs to sue for equitable relief.226 The 
Court further held that federal courts’ equitable “power . . . to enjoin unlawful 
executive action is subject to express and implied statutory limitations.”227 
Because equitable relief can be implicitly foreclosed by statutes that do not 
speak directly to the availability of equitable relief, Abbasi may have been too 
quick to assume that equitable relief was available when no statute specifically 
authorized it.228 
 
 223. 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 
(2006) (quoting Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)) 
(“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”). 
 224. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate “sufficient 
likelihood that he will . . . be wronged”). Subsequent cases described the standard to be that a plaintiff 
must demonstrate a substantial risk of future injury. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 
139, 153–54 (2010). Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA described the requirement as that a plaintiff must 
establish “certainly impending” injury, but also held the plaintiffs had not established a substantial 
risk. 568 U.S. 398, 401, 414 n.5 (2013). Subsequent cases have described sufficient risk as the required 
showing. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014). That may be easier to do 
when there is a sufficiently widespread pattern of executive action, which raises the possibility that the 
standard for obtaining injunctive relief places a premium on systemic wrongdoing, as do the standards 
for damages, the exclusionary rule, and habeas corpus. See supra text accompanying notes 117–130. 
 225. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1853 (“[R]espondents alleged that petitioners detained them in 
harsh conditions because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 226. 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). 
 227. Id. at 1385. 
 228. Indeed, Abbasi observed that Congress has enacted several pieces of legislation relevant to 
the petitioners’ claims, including requiring semi-annual reports on conditions of confinement from the 
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Abbasi acknowledged, but failed to appreciate, another formal, legal limit 
on the availability of the other remedy it suggested—habeas petitions.229 
Abbasi explained that the plaintiffs might have been able to challenge their 
confinement via petitions for writs of habeas corpus.230 But it is not clear 
whether the plaintiffs could actually have done so. One of the plaintiffs’ claims 
was that the conditions of their confinement (such as the alleged shackling and 
physical abuse) were unlawful and violated the Fifth Amendment.231 That 
claim challenges how the plaintiffs were treated during their detention, but not 
whether they could be detained at all. Habeas, on the other hand, is generally a 
challenge to the government’s authority to detain an individual.232 As Abbasi 
acknowledged, two prior cases had reserved the question of whether detainees 
could challenge the conditions of their confinement with petitions for habeas 
corpus, as opposed to suits for damages or injunctive relief.233 
Abbasi is not the only example of the Court’s failure to appreciate the 
formal legal limits on the availability of the other remedies that the Court holds 
out as alternatives. For example, the Court sometimes notes that municipal 
liability is a substitute for damages against individual officers, without 
acknowledging the heightened standard it has established for municipal 
liability, which tracks the qualified immunity standard in important respects. 234 
Namely, the heightened standard for municipal liability requires an official 
policy or custom and deliberate indifference toward individuals’ rights.235 
In addition to the formal, legal limits on the availability of other potential 
remedies, there are also frequently practical limits on the availability of other 
remedies that may render those remedies equally unavailable. Again consider 
Abbasi, which suggested that the plaintiffs, who were detained in allegedly 
abusive conditions, should have filed habeas petitions challenging their 
confinement.236 As Abbasi noted, the detainees “were denied access to most 
 
Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General. 137 S. Ct. at 1862. In Exceptional Child 
Center, the Court concluded that equitable relief was unavailable because Congress had offered 
another solution for violations: funding cutoffs. 135 S. Ct. at 1385. 
 229. See, e.g., Constitutional Remedies—Bivens Actions, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
313, 318–19 (2017) (“After Abbasi, an alternative remedy like habeas may suffice even if . . . there is a 
credible argument that the suggested remedy did not, as a matter of law, exist.”). 
 230. 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63. 
 231. Id. at 1862–63 (noting the Court had not yet held that prisoners could “challenge their 
confinement conditions via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus”). 
 232. Under Heck v. Humphrey, habeas is “the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who 
challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release,” whereas 
section 1983 suits (whether for damages or injunctions) are for everything else. 512 U.S. 477, 481 
(1994). 
 233. 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979); Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973)). 
 234. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242–43 (2009). 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 117–121; Smith, supra note 208, at 424–38. 
 236. Here too, Abbasi is not the only example. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 
(2007) (acknowledging that alternative remedy amounted to “death by a thousand cuts”); id. at 576 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (elaborating). 
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forms of communication with the outside world” and held in “tiny cells for 
over [twenty-three] hours a day,” where the lights were on for twenty-four 
hours a day.237 It is not clear how the detainees, who were also undocumented 
and lacked legal training, would have been able to write their own habeas 
petitions and get those habeas petitions to their proper venue. Nor is it clear 
how they could have sought injunctive relief before they were detained, 
because they would have had to identify themselves as undocumented. 
C. Lack of Fit 
Convergence in the standards for obtaining different remedies also results 
in a set of doctrinal limits on the various remedies that do not make sense of 
differences between the remedies, or concerns that are particular to each 
remedy. A remedial standard that focuses on the apparent novelty of the 
governmental action and the degree to which that action resembles a prior 
(Supreme Court) case does not make sense for all of the various remedies given 
the Court’s concerns about the various remedies. 
Take implied causes of action for damages under Bivens. In Abbasi, the 
Court held that “new” causes of action should generally not be recognized, and 
defined “novel” as whether a cause of action resembles, in all meaningful 
respects, a prior decision of the Supreme Court.238 However, whether the 
claims asserted in a case resemble the claims in a prior Bivens case decided by 
the Supreme Court does not capture the reasons why the Court is skeptical of 
Bivens causes of action. Abbasi explained that Bivens causes of action are 
disfavored because “claims against federal officials often create substantial 
costs, in the form of defense and indemnification.”239 But those same costs are 
generated in cases that enforce rights for which Bivens causes of action have 
already been recognized. If the substantial costs of defending damages actions 
are a primary concern with Bivens, the availability of a cause of action should 
turn on considerations such as the likely number of lawsuits that would seek to 
enforce that right (i.e., whether a plaintiff is asserting the kind of right or kind 
of violation that is likely to recur). If it is unlikely that there will be many 
future suits raising similar claims, then recognizing a cause of action to enforce 
a given constitutional right will not generate many costs. 
Indeed, Abbasi’s “novelty” standard might even get things backwards if 
the goal is to minimize litigation costs. Under Bivens, there is a cause of action 
for Fourth Amendment violations that occur in the ordinary course of law 
enforcement, which the Supreme Court has recognized is a “common and 
recurrent sphere of law enforcement.”240 But under Abbasi, there is no cause of 
action to challenge the government’s response to an unprecedented event (the 
 
 237. 137 S. Ct. at 1853. 
 238. Id. at 1859–60. 
 239. Id. at 1856. 
 240. Id. at 1857. 
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September 11 terrorist attacks)—a policy of holding persons in the United 
States in allegedly extreme conditions (including physical and verbal abuse), 
without bail or access to the outside world, on the basis of their race, religion, 
and nationality.241 
Abbasi also repeatedly invoked separation-of-powers principles as a 
reason why courts should not imply causes of action, asserting that “the judicial 
task” is “limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the 
private right of action asserted.”242 Even under that account of the separation of 
powers,243 it is not clear that Abbasi’s standard makes sense. Since Bivens was 
decided in 1971, Congress has not disapproved of Bivens suits. It has, instead, 
chosen to preserve suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution,”244 a 
category that does not distinguish between constitutional provisions for which 
the Court has already implied a private right of action and constitutional 
provisions for which the Court has not.245 There are reasons to be particularly 
skeptical that Congress has implicitly disagreed only with those Bivens actions 
that seek to enforce new rights: If a constitutional violation has not previously 
arisen, or if there is no Supreme Court case on whether there is a Bivens action 
to enforce a particular right, Congress may not have thought about whether 
there should be a cause of action. By contrast, if the Supreme Court has 
decided a case about whether to recognize a cause of action to enforce a 
specific constitutional right, Congress is more likely to be aware of the 
possibility of a private right of action to enforce a particular constitutional 
provision.246 
 
 241. Id. at 1854. 
 242. Id. at 1856 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)). 
 243. The Court’s opinion also assumes a definition of the separation of powers under which the 
role of the federal courts should be restricted. As Justice Breyer’s dissent made clear, there is an 
alternative account of the separation of powers that envisions the federal courts as having 
“considerable legal authority to use traditional remedies to right constitutional wrongs.” 137 S. Ct. at 
1874 (Breyer, J., dissenting). If the separation of powers and judges’ role within the separation of 
powers is defined as enforcing the Constitution, then permitting Bivens suits to proceed furthers that 
role, rather than undermining it. However, the Court’s contested account of the separation of powers 
largely assumes the answer to the question it is deciding. 
 244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that certain provisions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act do not apply to any claim against a federal employee “which is brought for a violation 
of the Constitution”). 
 245. Some scholars argue that Congress has ratified Bivens through these statutes. See James E. 
Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 117 (2009). Others argue the exemption “is capacious enough to preserve state law remedies.” 
Carlos M. Vazquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, The Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens 
Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (2013). 
 246. See Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, supra note 160, at 1434 n.157 (identifying doctrines 
that presume Congress responds to judicial decisions, rather than the absence of them). Abbe R. Gluck 
and Lisa Schultz Bressman’s recent studies of Congress call into question how much Congress knows 
about Supreme Court cases, however. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory 
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Moreover, if Abbasi’s goal is for courts to effectuate Congress’s intent as 
to the availability of private suits to enforce constitutional rights, any standard 
governing the availability of a private right of action should take into account 
the background principles and expectations against which Congress legislates. 
And Congress could operate under background constitutional principles of the 
kind that Justice Breyer identified, such as “where there is a legal right, there is 
also a legal remedy,” the supposition that the “federal courts [have] 
considerable legal authority to use traditional remedies to right constitutional 
wrongs,” or the practice of courts implying private rights of action for equitable 
relief to enforce constitutional guarantees.247 If those are the background 
principles against which Congress legislates, then Congress’s failure to 
explicitly authorize a private right of action for damages is only a weak signal 
of Congress’s expectations about the availability of a private right of action.248 
Abbasi’s reliance on the aforementioned “separation-of-powers 
principles” also does not explain why suits for damages raise more concerns 
than suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. Abbasi declined to recognize a 
damages cause of action partially because it identified separation-of-powers 
concerns with judges recognizing causes of action that Congress had not 
enacted into law.249 But Abbasi also maintained that “injunctive relief” was 
both preferable to damages suits and available,250 even though Congress had 
not authorized equitable relief either.251 And the Court has elsewhere expressed 
the view that the availability of equitable relief in constitutional cases is, like 
the availability of suits for damages, a choice that is better left to Congress.252 
Abbasi also laid out concerns with judges reviewing the executive branch’s 
national security determinations, because the executive is comparatively more 
accountable than judges and also has comparatively more information than 
 
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014). 
 247. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1874 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 248. The Court has relied on a related idea in the context of implied rights of action for 
statutory violations—the idea that if Congress is legislating against a backdrop of courts implying 
rights of action, then Congress’s failure to include one explicitly is not particularly probative of 
Congress’s expectations about the existence of a cause of action. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 
U.S. 677, 698 (1979) (“[D]uring the period between the enactment of Title VI in 1964 and the 
enactment of Title IX in 1972, this Court had consistently found implied remedies—often in cases 
much less clear than this.”); id. at 718 (“Cases such as J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, and numerous 
cases from other federal courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary would 
undertake this task.”) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 249. 137 S. Ct. at 1855–56. 
 250. Id. at 1862–63. 
 251. Thus, when Abbasi observed “that high-level policies will attract the attention of 
Congress,” that did not distinguish between suits that challenge high level policies and seek equitable 
relief from suits that challenge high level policies but seek damages. Id. at 1862. 
 252. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387–88 (2015). 
1518 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1477 
them.253 But the same would occur in a case seeking injunctive relief; there, 
too, courts would have to inquire into the lawfulness of a policy that was 
formulated in the name of national security.254 A request for injunctive relief 
(or a habeas petition) would also challenge the executive’s policy as it was 
being implemented, rather than after it had passed, since injunctive relief is 
only available if a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of future harm.255 Suits for 
injunctive relief generate many of the same costs as suits for damages, 
including “discovery and litigation process[es] [that] would either border upon 
or directly implicate the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation 
of the policy in question.”256 Thus, the separation-of-powers concerns that 
Abbasi identified with suits for damages relief do not necessarily distinguish 
those suits from suits for equitable relief. 
D. Unidirectional Convergence 
The Court’s remedial convergence has also operated, in practice, only to 
the benefit of the government. The overlap between the remedies rarely 
operates to the benefit of parties seeking relief in federal court. Even when one 
overlapping remedial doctrine suggests that a party is entitled to relief, the 
Court will not interpret the other remedial doctrine in a manner favoring the 
party seeking relief. And when judges question the scope of one of the remedial 
doctrines that has converged with the others, they isolate the particular 
remedial doctrine they are questioning and do not attempt to make the remedies 
collectively converge toward standards that favor parties seeking relief. This 
pattern undermines the idea that convergence merely reflects similarities 
between the different remedies, rather than a disagreement with remedies 
generally. 
Where two remedial doctrines intersect with one another, the Court does 
not rely on indications in one doctrine that the party is entitled to relief to 
conclude that the other doctrine entitles a party to relief as well. For example, 
Davis v. United States addressed a question about the exclusionary rule—
 
 253. 137 S. Ct. at 1861 (explaining that the claim challenged “major elements of the 
Government’s whole response to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry into 
sensitive issues of national security”). 
 254. Abbasi concluded by speculating that: 
[t]hese concerns are even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context 
of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive or other equitable 
relief. The risk of personal damages liability is more likely to cause an official to second-
guess difficult but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy. 
Id. However, none of the concerns Abbasi raised were specific to altering officials’ ex ante incentives, 
as opposed to courts evaluating the executive’s policies ex post, or in the case of equitable relief, as the 
policies are being implemented. See id. 
 255. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Implied Constitutional Remedies After Abbasi, in AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2016–2017 179, 199 (Steven D. Schwinn ed., 
2017). 
 256. Id. at 1860–61. 
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whether evidence that was obtained unlawfully should be excluded from a 
criminal trial where a prior case had mistakenly indicated that the evidence was 
obtained lawfully.257 But the case was also related to a question about 
retroactivity—whether newly announced decisions apply to cases that have or 
have not become final. As a matter of retroactivity, “new” decisions (even 
those that overturn an earlier decision) apply to a defendant’s case, and the 
defendant is entitled to relief because “new” rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure apply to cases that have not yet become final.258 Despite the 
defendant’s (and the dissent’s) repeated attempts to borrow from retroactivity 
doctrine, Davis held that for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the defendant 
could not benefit from the new rule.259 Thus, while the contours of retroactivity 
doctrine would have given the benefit of a new rule to the defendant, the 
exclusionary rule denied this benefit.260 
The Court also does not use the overlap among the various doctrines, such 
as the availability of a cause of action and qualified immunity, as a reason to 
avoid imposing additional limits on remedies. In Abbasi, the Court offered 
several reasons why courts should be hesitant to imply causes of action against 
federal officials for damages, including the “substantial costs, in the form of 
defense and indemnification”261 that damages actions generate, and the risk that 
a damages action could “prevent the[] [officials] or . . . future officials like 
them . . . from devoting the time and effort required for the proper discharge of 
their duties” by “caus[ing] an official to second-guess difficult but necessary 
decisions.”262 But those are the same reasons the Court has given for the 
existence of qualified immunity—qualified immunity from damages safeguards 
officials from the costs of litigation and avoids the possibility that officers 
would be deterred from making difficult judgements in the course of 
performing their duties.263 Thus, the purposes the Court used to explain its 
reasons for narrowing the availability of a cause of action could and would 
have been served by the existence of qualified immunity. 
 
 257. 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 258. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987). 
 259. 564 U.S. at 328. 
 260. See id. at 253 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Leaving Davis with a right but not a remedy, the 
Court ‘keep[s] the word of promise to our ear’ but ‘break[s] it to our hope.’”); id. at 254 (“A new 
‘good faith’ exception and this Court’s retroactivity decisions are incompatible. For one thing, the 
Court’s distinction between (1) retroactive application of a new rule and (2) availability of a remedy is 
highly artificial and runs counter to precedent.”). 
 261. 137 S. Ct. at 1856. 
 262. Id. at 1860–61. 
 263. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (“[I]n this pleading context, . . . we are 
impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be 
neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.”); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
563 U.S. 731, 746–47 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If national officeholders were subject to 
personal liability whenever they confronted disagreement among appellate courts, those officers would 
be deterred from full use of their legal authority. The consequences of that deterrence must counsel 
caution by the Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security.”). 
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Abbasi also illustrates how remedial convergence operates as a one-way 
ratchet because courts can peel back the limitations on one of the doctrines 
without doing so for the other doctrine. In Abbasi, Justice Thomas wrote 
separately to express his “growing concern with [the Court’s] qualified 
immunity jurisprudence” and to urge the Court to “reconsider” its qualified 
immunity jurisprudence “[i]n an appropriate case.”264 He also noted some 
evidence that the scope of qualified immunity was far broader than its original 
scope.265 But Justice Thomas also expressed the view that he would have 
narrowed the availability of a cause of action against federal officials even 
more than the majority in Abbasi.266 Thus, while it might be the case that a 
federal official would not be immune for damages, the official still could not be 
sued for damages because there would be no implied cause of action for a 
plaintiff to do so.  
Hernandez v. Mesa, a case decided the week after Abbasi, illustrates this 
point. In that case, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a court of appeals’ 
determination that a federal official was entitled to qualified immunity.267 After 
concluding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, the Court 
remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether, in light of 
Abbasi, the victim’s family even had a cause of action to sue the officer for 
damages under Bivens.268 Justice Thomas wrote separately to say that there was 
no cause of action, confirming that he would not question the other doctrine the 
Court had recently fashioned in the shape of qualified immunity.269 
III. 
EXPLANATIONS 
This Section reflects on possible explanations for the Court’s 
jurisprudence of convergence. Part II demonstrated how remedial convergence 
makes little sense in light of other doctrinal features, particularly the suggestion 
that the different remedies can substitute for one another. Part III therefore 
discusses some alternative reasons that may explain, if not justify, the remedial 
convergence and ratcheting up of the different remedial standards. 
 
 264. 137 S. Ct. at 1870, 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 265. Id. at 1869–72. 
 266. Id. at 1870 (“I have thus declined to ‘extend Bivens even [where] its reasoning logically 
applied,’ thereby limiting ‘Bivens and its progeny . . . to the precise circumstances that they 
involved.’ . . . [I]n order for there to be a controlling judgment in this suit, I concur in the 
judgment . . . as that disposition is closest to my preferred approach.”). 
 267. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). The official was a customs and border patrol agent who, while 
standing in Texas, shot and killed a 15-year-old Mexican national who was hiding under a bridge on 
the Mexican side of the shared border space that connects El Paso and Juarez. 
 268. Id. at 2006–07. 
 269. Id. at 2008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on 
remand from the Court, held that the Hernandez family did not have a cause of action. Hernandez v. 
Mesa, 869 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2017). 
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As other scholars have noted, the availability of remedies for 
constitutional violations has narrowed as the Supreme Court has become more 
conservative.270 Aziz Huq, however, has recently challenged whether judicial 
ideology, meaning the political affiliation of the administration that appointed a 
judge, explains the narrowing of the exclusionary rule and habeas corpus and 
the expansion of qualified immunity.271 He has argued that “key 
precedent . . . is surprisingly bereft of sharp ideological division.”272 While the 
opinions in the relevant cases may not always split 5–4, other evidence 
complicates his description of the doctrinal changes. For example, with respect 
to qualified immunity, Huq notes that the Court’s 2011 statement about the 
broad scope of qualified immunity generated no dissents.273 But that statement 
merely quoted a prior case,274 which had generated a dissenting opinion that 
split along ideological lines, as Huq acknowledges.275 Moreover, while the 
particular opinion Huq references did not lead to dissents, it did generate 
 
 270. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (“In the almost thirty years since Nixon’s 
victory, the Supreme Court’s pulse-takers have offered periodic updates on the fate of the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure ‘revolution’ in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.”); Peter Arenella, 
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing 
Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983) (arguing that the Burger Court favored “judicial deregulation 
of state and federal criminal justice officials,” and showed “hostility to fair process norms that impair 
the state’s capacity to detect and punish the factually guilty”); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, 
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon 
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227 (1971) (noting the “[i]deological ebb and flow” in the Court’s 
criminal procedure jurisprudence). 
 271. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9; Huq, Habeas, supra note 9. Huq offers as an 
alternative explanation the judiciary’s interest in caseload management and notes that crime rates and 
criminal prosecutions rose significantly during the 1970s and 1980s. See Huq, Judicial Independence, 
supra note 9, at 58–59. But it is less clear whether there was a similar explosion of crime rates through 
the 1990s and 2000s that would explain the Court’s further narrowing of the general standard which it 
had outlined. See supra Part I. Indeed, during that period, crime rates fell. See Matt Ford, What Caused 
the Great Crime Decline in the U.S.?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/what-caused-the-crime-decline/477408/ 
[https://perma.cc/7M6H-5DJL] (summarizing multiple studies showing crime has fallen over the last 
two decades); OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME 
DECLINE? (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline 
[https://perma.cc/6RPE-795F] (same). See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN 
CRIME DECLINE (2007). But there was no responsive expanding of judicial remedies, even as “smart 
on crime” policies became more popular with conservative and liberal politicians. See supra Part I; 
Eric Schulzke, Why Some Republicans, Like Utah Sen. Mike Lee, Now Call Themselves ‘Smart on 
Crime,’ DESERT NEWS (May 3, 2017), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865679134/Why-some-
conservative-Republicans-are-leading-the-fight-against-over-incarceration.html 
[https://perma.cc/H8BA-FZWM]; Sasha Abramksy, How California Voters Got So Smart on Crime, 
NATION (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-california-voters-got-so-smart-
crime/ [https://perma.cc/DF8G-PW5T]. 
 272. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 47. 
 273. Id. at 48. 
 274. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 457 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). 
 275. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 48–49 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635 (1987)). 
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separate opinions. The separate opinions, which were joined or written by the 
comparatively more liberal Justices, all offered ways to limit the majority 
opinion and narrow the scope of qualified immunity.276 Huq also notes that the 
majority opinion in Messerschmidt v. Millender, which involved “a harsh 
application” of qualified immunity, comprised “a supermajority of Justices that 
include[d] both liberals and conservatives.”277 But here too, the more liberal 
Justices who voted in favor of qualified immunity in Millender offered 
narrower interpretations of the majority opinion (or narrower grounds to rule in 
favor of the officers) in their separate writings.278 Additionally, the dissenting 
Justices in Millender were all comparatively more liberal Justices.279 Indeed, it 
is difficult to find any pro-government qualified immunity opinion from the 
last decade where the dissent is joined by one of the more conservative 
Justices.280 Thus, even if some comparatively more liberal Justices do 
sometimes vote for government officials in qualified immunity cases, the core 
group of Justices who always do so in divided cases are the more conservative 
Justices. 
The post-conviction review cases show a similar trend. Huq writes that 
the Court “has coalesced into a united front in demanding that habeas 
petitioners satisfy Harrington v. Richter’s more onerous and demanding 
version” of section 2254(d)’s precondition to relief.281 And, he maintains, there 
“is a remarkable series of decisions in which a unanimous Court . . . has 
reversed habeas decisions without briefing or oral argument.”282 But the 
evolution of section 2254(d) is more complicated than Huq’s claim that a 
unanimous Supreme Court comprised of both liberal and conservative Justices 
has adopted a standard that the Court rejected at a time when it “had more 
 
 276. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 746–47 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting the majority’s 
requirement of a nationwide precedent was appropriate for officials with nationwide authority but not 
others); id. at 750 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting claims against FBI agents may be clearly 
established). 
 277. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 49; see also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 
U.S. 535 (2012). 
 278. 565 U.S. at 556–57 (Breyer, J., concurring) (identifying both conditions listed in the 
majority as necessary to a finding of immunity); id. at 558 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (concluding reliance on one part of the warrant was unreasonable and, thus, that officers were 
not immune). 
 279. Id. at 560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 280. See e.g., Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1278 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing summary judgment based on qualified immunity to officer was improper); White 
v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 553 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that opinion should not 
foreclose denial of summary judgment to officer based on qualified immunity); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 
S. Ct. 305 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (discussed infra); Reichle v. 
Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 670 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that “ordinary law 
enforcement officers” would not be entitled “to qualified immunity”). 
 281. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 50–51; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86 (2011). 
 282. Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 50–51. 
2018] REMEDIAL CONVERGENCE AND COLLAPSE 1523 
Republican appointees” than it does now.283 One of the Republican appointees 
included in Huq’s tally is Justice Stevens, who by that point typically voted 
with the Court’s more liberal Justices in cases that divided along ideological 
lines.284 Moreover, between Terry Williams and Richter, Justice Alito had 
replaced Justice O’Connor, which shifted the Court to the right. And as in the 
case of qualified immunity, while there are some unanimous opinions reversing 
a lower court for failing to apply section 2254(d)’s standard, there are also 
many such opinions with dissents, all of which are by the comparatively more 
liberal Justices.285 There are also opinions that address new questions about the 
scope of section 2254(d)’s relitigation bar, which divide along lines of judicial 
ideology.286 And in habeas corpus cases that involve the scope of judge-made 
rules like procedural default, several cases split along similar lines.287 
The exclusionary rule cases also evidence considerable ideological 
division.288 Herring v. United States, which extended the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule to cover cases of negligence by the police, was 5–4 and 
generated two separate dissents.289 The most recent expansion of the good faith 
exception, Utah v. Strieff, was 5–3 and also generated two separate dissents, 
including a dissent by Justice Sotomayor that used language evocative of the 
Black Lives Matter movement and cited James Baldwin.290 
The ideological division is also evident in statements that some Justices 
have made about the cases that formally recognized the relevant remedies 
against government officials. Some Justices have openly disagreed with cases 
 
 283. Id. at 51; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 284. See, e.g., David G. Savage, John Paul Stevens’ Unexpectedly Liberal Legacy, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2010) (“[S]ince the mid-1990s, Justice Stevens has been the leader of the court’s liberal wing 
and its strongest voice for progressive causes.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul 
Stevens, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 23, 2007) (“Justice Stevens, the oldest and arguably most liberal 
justice, now finds himself the leader of the opposition.”). 
 285. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Cash v. Maxwell, 565 U.S. 1138 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining certiorari denial); id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging 
reversal); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 526 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Cavazos v. Smith, 565 
U.S. 1, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 286. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1707 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor). 
 287. See Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (scope of procedural default); Davila v. Davis, 
137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (same); Kernan v. Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603 (2016) (scope of look-through 
rule). 
 288. Huq claimed “the evidence of ideological polarization over the exclusionary rule is 
weaker” and that “more recent opinions . . . have attracted smaller dissents.” Judicial Independence, 
supra note 9, at 51–52. 
 289. 555 U.S. 135, 148 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer); 
id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Souter). 
 290. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg); id. at 2071 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); Mark Joseph Stern, Read Sonia Sotomayor’s Atomic Bomb of a Dissent 
Slamming Racial Profiling and Mass Imprisonment, SLATE (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/06/20/sonia_sotomayor_dissent_in_utah_v_strieff_takes
_on_police_misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/QAW8-SAQ3]. Strieff was one of the cases decided 
during the term that Justice Scalia passed away. 
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that established the exclusionary rule,291 cases that recognized implied causes 
of actions against federal officials,292 cases that allowed suits against state or 
local officers who may be violating state law, in addition to federal law,293 and 
cases that permitted state court prisoners to relitigate claims in federal habeas 
proceedings.294 In particular, they argue that the decisions recognizing these 
various remedies were acts of judicial lawmaking, with the more conservative 
Justices openly questioning the decisions that recognize the remedies and the 
more liberal Justices not doing so. 
The criticism that the more conservative Justices have leveled at the 
different remedies, that they represent judicial (common) lawmaking, relates to 
another mechanism that contributes to convergence. The fact that the different 
remedies are creatures of common law in important ways does not mean that 
the remedies and their contours are judicially invented.295 It may, however, 
mean that courts are drawn to rely on existing bodies of law to develop them.296 
Consider, for example, Abbasi, where Justice Kennedy defined a “new Bivens 
context” as a case that “is different in a meaningful way.”297 As examples of 
what constitutes meaningful differences, he listed “the rank of the officers 
involved,”298 which is a factor that had crept into the courts’ qualified 
immunity jurisprudence in assessing the extent to which law was clearly 
established as to that officer.299 Abbasi also incorporated “the extent of judicial 
 
 291. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006) (describing exclusion as a “last resort”); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) 
(describing exclusionary rule as a “‘prudential’ doctrine . . . created by [the] Court,” which the Fourth 
“Amendment says nothing about”). 
 292. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971); Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring 
to Bivens as a “relic of the heady days in which th[e] Court assumed common-law powers to create 
causes of action”). 
 293. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611–12 
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The § 1983 that the Court created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to 
what Congress enacted . . . . I refer, of course, to the holding of Monroe v. Pape.”). 
 294. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Memorandum from John G. Roberts, Jr., Office of 
the Attorney General, on Possible Reforms of the Availability of Federal Habeas Corpus (Nov. 12, 
1981) (“The current availability of federal habeas corpus, particularly for state prisoners, goes far to 
making a mockery of the entire criminal justice system.”). 
 295. While section 1983 codifies a cause of action against state officials, it leaves everything 
other than the cause of action to judicial determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens actions and the 
exclusionary rule are remedies developed using common law reasoning that isn’t tied to a specific 
piece of text. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388; Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. Additionally, the disagreement over whether 
relitigation is permitted in federal habeas proceedings concerns a decision (Brown v. Allen) that 
reinterpreted a statute that had been on the books for decades. Cf. supra note 294. 
 296. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 63 (2015) (noting that “federal common law” includes different categories ranging from 
traditional principles of common law, customary practices, and rules that federal judges simply make 
up, and noting that describing common law as entirely judge-made law may enable more freewheeling 
common law practices). 
 297. 137 S. Ct. at 1859. 
 298. Id. at 1860. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42. 
2018] REMEDIAL CONVERGENCE AND COLLAPSE 1525 
guidance as to how an officer should respond,”300 which also incorporates ideas 
from qualified immunity and post-conviction review about how “clearly 
established” a right is under case law.301 Those concepts may have found their 
way into the scope of Bivens causes of action because of their familiarity, and 
their familiarity contributed to their persuasiveness. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2254(d)’s relitigation bar 
proceeded similarly, and ultimately led the Court to embrace an interpretation 
that harkened more toward other areas of law, and specifically qualified 
immunity. In Terry Williams, the Court’s original interpretation of section 
2254(d)’s standard for obtaining a writ of habeas corpus, the Court had said 
that section 2254(d)’s standard differs from the standards for qualified 
immunity.302 In doing so, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation 
of section 2254(d)(1), under which a state court decision was unreasonable if it 
applied federal law “in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is 
unreasonable.”303 
While the Court rejected that standard in Williams, it ultimately embraced 
something similar to it over the course of many cases that drew on the qualified 
immunity standard. In the damages context, the Court has held that officials are 
immune if “a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was 
justified,”304 and stated that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory 
or constitutional question beyond debate.”305 Both of those ideas have appeared 
in the Court’s most recent descriptions of section 2254(d), where the Court has 
explained that habeas is unavailable “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 
disagree’ on the correctness of” the way a claim was adjudicated,306 and that an 
error so “well understood and comprehended in existing law” is “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”307 
But the Court has also seemingly drawn from ideas in post-conviction law 
in order to elaborate the standard for qualified immunity. When Terry Williams 
interpreted section 2254, it noted that section 2254(d) effected a change from 
other areas, such as qualified immunity or retroactivity, in that section 2254(d) 
required clearly established Supreme Court rules, as opposed to rules that were 
 
 300. 137 S. Ct. at 1860. 
 301. See supra text accompanying notes 28–39. 
 302. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 n.12 (2000) (“We are not persuaded by the 
argument that because Congress used the words ‘clearly established law’ and not ‘new rule,’ it meant 
in this section to codify an aspect of the doctrine of executive qualified immunity rather than Teague’s 
antiretroactivity bar.”). 
 303. Id. at 409 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 304. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015). 
 305. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
 306. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
 307. Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786–87 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86, 101 (2011)); see White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 (2014); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 
10, 16 (2013); Wetzel v. Lambert, 565 U.S. 520, 524 (2012). 
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clearly established in other courts.308 But the requirement of a relevant 
Supreme Court case has seeped into qualified immunity over time. In qualified 
immunity, the Court has, since Terry Williams, declared that only a “robust 
‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” clearly establishes a right for 
purposes of qualified immunity.309 It has also suggested that the law may need 
to be clearly established “in the entire United States,” though perhaps only for 
certain officials.310 Thus, the common-law type reasoning that the Court is 
forced to rely on to develop the different remedies may drive the convergence 
among them. 
The fact that some Justices, and perhaps a majority of Justices, question 
the validity of the underlying remedies provides another explanation for 
ratcheting up the standard that plaintiffs have to meet in order to obtain the 
different remedies. Ratcheting up the standards for plaintiffs to obtain these 
remedies may be a way to narrow the scope of the decisions recognizing the 
remedies without outright overruling them; some opinions frame the reasoning 
in these terms.311 
There are, however, some reasons why the current system of convergence 
may not be justified, rather than merely explained, as a way of narrowing the 
relevant decisions. Bracketing whether all of the decisions are correct or not, a 
question that is beyond the scope of this Article, one reason to be skeptical of 
whether this explanation suffices as a justification is that it posits and accepts a 
system in which all of the remedies discussed in this Article (writs of habeas 
corpus, exclusion of evidence, damages actions against state and federal 
officers) are not and should not be available. That leads to the concerns 
discussed in Part II.A, namely that the state can deny people’s rights in a wide 
range of domains and those people may have no effective recourse. 
 
 308. It is not clear how much that differentiates section 2254(d) from Teague, given the Court’s 
expansive interpretation of what constitutes a new rule. See supra text accompanying notes 59–63. 
 309. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011). In that case, the Court stated that 
district court decisions—or at least one district court decision—did not qualify because “a district 
judge’s ipse dixit of a holding is not ‘controlling authority’ in any jurisdiction.” Id. 
 310. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42; see also id. at 745–46 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The fact 
that the Attorney General holds a high office in the Government must inform what law is clearly 
established for the purposes of this case.”). Relatedly, the Court has repeatedly stated that it has only 
ever assumed that “controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established federal law,” even 
in cases where the relevant officials do not have nationwide authority. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (quoting Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014) (per 
curiam)); see, e.g., Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012) (“This Court has never held that 
there is such a right.”). But see Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2382 (2014) (“If Martinez and Tindal 
were controlling in the Eleventh Circuit in 2009, we would agree with Lane that Franks could not 
reasonably have believed that it was lawful to fire Lane in retaliation for his testimony.”). 
 311. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57: 
Indeed, in light of the changes to the Court’s general approach to recognizing implied damages 
remedies, it is possible that the analysis in the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been different if 
they were decided today. . . . Given the notable change in the Court’s approach to recognizing implied 
causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a 
‘disfavored’ judicial activity. 
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Additionally, if convergence is a means to narrow the remedies, then the 
Court’s lip service toward substitution, which Part II.B highlighted, is 
unnecessary and insincere. Still another reason to be skeptical is the mismatch 
between the limitations on the different remedies and the remedies themselves, 
as well as the mismatch between the limitations on the different remedies and 
the concerns with those remedies and the cases recognizing them that Part II.C 
discussed. 
Another reason to be skeptical of the idea that the current system 
effectuates a desire to limit erroneous decisions is that there is some evidence 
that the denial of remedies is partially the arbitrary product of vote cycling. 
That is, the denial of remedies altogether is a consequence of the Court’s 
attempt to aggregate the outcomes of multiple cases together when the Court 
aggregates the votes of individual judges to reach outcomes in particular cases. 
Consider, for example, Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy’s positions in 
Ziglar v. Abbasi312 (or other Bivens cases such as Correctional Services Co. v. 
Malesko313) and Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center.314 Although the cases 
do not involve similar constitutional rights, they illustrate how vote cycling can 
lead to the denial of remedies altogether. In Abbasi, Justice Kennedy declined 
to recognize a damages action against a federal official, whereas Justice Breyer 
would have done so. The two Justices’ opinions spoke about the relative 
unobtrusiveness of damages remedies compared to equitable ones and how to 
interpret congressional silence on the availability of damages remedies versus 
equitable ones. By contrast, in Exceptional Child Center, Justice Kennedy 
would have recognized a cause of action for equitable relief, whereas Justice 
Breyer declined to do so. And again, the two opinions315 discussed how to 
interpret congressional silence and ambiguity in light of how much equitable 
relief would intrude on federal administration.316 In Abbasi, Justice Breyer was 
in dissent, while the majority was comprised of the Chief Justice, Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.317 In Exceptional Child, Justice 
Breyer was in the majority with the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice Kennedy’s relative preference for equitable 
relief over damages and Justice Breyer’s relative preference for damages over 
equitable relief thus generated majorities against both equitable relief and 
damages. But no majority on the Court would have agreed that there should be 
neither equitable relief nor damages. 
 
 312. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
 313. 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 314. 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). 
 315. In this case, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. Id. at 1390 (Sotomayor, 
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 316. Id. at 1388 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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CONCLUSION 
The standards that govern the availability of different remedies in public 
law cases related to policing—habeas corpus, causes of action, damages, and 
exclusion of evidence—have converged on one another. This Article has 
outlined the consequences of that convergence, as well as some of its 
causes.  The convergence has resulted in the collapse of what is supposed to be 
an overarching and integrated system of remedies that is adequate to deter 
constitutional violations.  The convergence and collapse has occurred by way 
of a kind of shell game, where the Court looks at each remedial context 
separately, and denies one remedy based in part on an unjustified presumption 
that another remedy will be available to vindicate the underlying right in a 
different context. The presumption is no longer workable given that the same 
demanding standard operates to preclude remedies in so many different 
contexts.  Nor can the unavailability of the various remedies be explained as an 
effort to pare back on erroneous decisions, or as a rational system for rationing 
remedies—the status quo is largely a system of no remedies for constitutional 
rights as such, and the limits that apply to the various remedies make little 
sense of the remedies themselves or any concerns that may be unique to 
them.  The overall lack of remedies is, instead, partially a byproduct of 
individual Justices' preferences for different remedies, but when those 
preferences are aggregated together it results in a system of no remedies at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
